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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the relationship between 
sporting narratives and morality.  More specifically, I investigate how people can 
draw upon sporting experiences, as expressed in narrative form, to help shape and 
inform their moral choices.  Moreover, I argue that reflecting on sporting experiences 
in a particular way can have a profoundly valuable impact on our moral choices, thus, 
helping to improve us morally.  In addition, I argue that sporting narratives play a 
crucial moral role due, in large part, to their pervasiveness and accessibility.  Drawing 
from, and expanding on, the practical tradition of narrative ethics, and expanding 
upon Nelson’s (2001) conception of the narrative counterstory, I introduce two types 
of morally valuable sporting stories; sport as autobiography and sport as reflexive 
narrative.  I also demonstrate how each type of sporting story can lead one to make 
morally estimable choices.  I introduce the philosophical concepts of the moral 
conduit and moral mobility in order to reconcile a narrow conception of acceptable 
texts that one may utilize for moral purposes.  In addition, I examine four case studies 
that highlight the morally salient features of the two types of sporting stories I 
introduce.  Lastly, I draw conclusions, make practical recommendations and suggest 
directions for future research.    
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PREFACE 
 
 
 My interest in this project has been sparked by two important considerations.  
First, that philosophical investigations relating to moral questions have often failed to 
recognize the impact, both positive and negative, that popular activities, and sporting 
activities in particular, can have on an individual's moral decision making processes.  
Secondly, that employing a hybridized version of narrative ethics, one that 
accommodates sporting stories, can help to integrate alternative philosophical 
perspectives as they relate to moral questions.  What I mean when I say I incorporate 
a “hybridized version” of narrative ethics is that I am purposively (but certainly not 
seamlessly!) grafting elements of moral philosophy and narrative ethics with elements 
of both critical sport studies and cultural studies and thus expanding the boundaries of 
each.  Accordingly, my views have been fundamentally informed by work in several 
academic areas including, sport philosophy, narrative ethics, critical sport studies, 
cultural studies, and sport psychology.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 While there has been a growing body of philosophical literature that addresses 
the intersection between sport and morality (see for example, Morgan, 1999, 2000a, 
2000b, 2002, 2003; Davis, 2003; Lowland, 2001) there have been far fewer works 
that explore if and how sport participation influences moral deliberations.  Indeed, 
like their mainstream disciplinary counterparts, sport philosophers often rely on 
abstract theoretical constructs and hypothetical scenarios to present and support their 
arguments.  While this method of investigation has its merits, I would argue that it 
has not shed significant light on whether or how people incorporate sporting 
experiences into their lived day to day moral deliberations.  Rather than address the 
possibility that agents  do incorporate their sporting experiences, among other things, 
into a larger moral decision-making framework, many sport philosophers have simply 
looked at particular moral dilemmas, using performance enhancing drugs for 
example, and applied a theoretical analysis vis-à-vis existing philosophical 
frameworks (see Holowchak, 2000 for example).   
 By contrast, the question I am interested in (do one’s sporting experiences, 
broadly defined, impact moral decisions?) is a practical one. The answer to this 
question is better illuminated by investigating the actions and experiences of people 
within the context of their particular social, cultural and historical settings or what 
Meyers (2004) calls “the communitarian social self” (p. 291). In her view, the 
communitarian social self takes up moral concerns by, “underscoring the fact that 
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moral subjects are socialized or enculturated” (p. 291).  Moreover and importantly for 
my purposes, Meyers suggests that, “to become competent moral subjects, individuals 
must acquire a stock of cultural values, attitudes and interpretive frameworks and 
learn how to use these resources to understand and negotiate social relations” (p. 
291).   
In the balance of this dissertation I argue that considering sport in narrative 
terms is among the best ways to access these actions and social experiences as they 
relate to moral deliberations.  Moreover, following Nelson (1997, 2001) and Meyers 
(2004) I argue that narratives in general and sporting narratives construed as an 
important type of narrative, can help to address some of the long standing divides 
within the realm of moral philosophy especial as it relates to the articulation of the 
moral subject or moral actor. 
    
Tension in Applied Ethics and Moral Philosophy 
The rationale to incorporate narrative into a moral or ethical decision making 
framework, is arguably the attempt to reconcile longstanding disagreements about 
both what persons count as moral subjects and how those subjects, in fact, make 
moral decisions or deliberations.  In order to more strongly assert the efficacy of 
narratives to do moral work, it will be important to demonstrate how (I believe) 
narrative, broadly considered, helps to bridge the vexing problem of universal versus 
particular (and often relative) moral justification.  To address this central issue, I’ll 
rely on a critical sport studies variation of narrative ethics.  Prior to explicating this 
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notion however, it is important to situate this project within the context of moral 
philosophy in general and practical ethics in particular.   
I have suggested that this inquiry is informed, in part, by a practical or applied 
ethics perspective. That statement might suggest that there is a particular orthodoxy to 
the method that philosophers use when looking at moral questions from a practical 
ethics perspective; this however, is not the case.  In fact, practical ethics as a 
discipline is dogged by the same tension that has confounded moral philosophers for 
years; namely the tension between universal principals of “right” moral actions on the 
one hand and the (above mentioned) individuality of moral choice that emphasize, 
“moral tradition, experience, and particular circumstances” (Beauchamp, 2003, p. 7) 
on the other.   
Beauchamp (2003) explores this problem of “method and justification” (p. 7) 
in practical ethics and develops two useful explanatory models.  The first model that 
Beauchamp highlights corresponds to the above mentioned ‘universal principal of 
right actions.’  He calls this model the top-down model.  The top-down model of 
moral justification in applied ethics according to Beauchamp, asserts that “pre-
existing general norms are applied to new situations” (p. 7).  Our moral judgments, on 
this view, even in situations we have never encountered before, are guided by larger 
“covering principals” (p. 7).  These general moral rules, one should not kill for 
example, guide our actions in any situation where taking the life of another may be a 
possibility.  While this system of moral decision making may be plausible in 
relatively unambiguous situations, it is clear that many moral judgments are decidedly 
ambiguous.  Moreover, general principals of ethical conduct often give way to 
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“traditional practices, institutional rules, and case judgments” (Beauchamp, 2003, 
p.8). 
In contrast to the top-down model of moral justification is the bottom-up 
model.  As the name might suggest, this model focuses, not on general principals and 
theories, but rather on how practical decisions are made.  The bottom-up model, 
according to Beauchamp, “take(s) seriously the idea that ethical decisions make use 
of existing social agreements and practices, insight-producing novel cases, and 
comparative case analysis as the starting-point from which we commonly make moral 
decisions” (p. 8-9).  The bottom-up perspective clearly draws from both pragmatist 
and particulaism standpoints.  Moral and ethical decisions, and indeed this branch of 
practical ethics, rely more on a consensus of thought about a particularly vexing 
moral issue.  Thus, only after dealing with many agonizing cases is a society able to 
permit and classify as justifiable, actions that would have been expressly forbidden 
heretofore. 
It is this second sense of moral justification that interests me and has informed 
my thinking about sporting narratives and moral efficacy.  Moral justification based 
on the relative contingency of one’s experiences is certainly not new to sport 
philosophers.  Morgan (2003) and others have convincingly argued for the context 
specificity of moral inquiry and moral choice while making important claims about 
the moral features of particular local and perhaps national social communities.   I am 
in agreement with this non-universalistic perspective especially in the sense that there 
seem to be ample instances of conflicting moral perspective on a number of issues. 
Where does the “infinite regress of justification” (Beauchamp, 2003, p. 10) end?  
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Each appeal to a guiding or covering principal requires a higher level justification.  
Where does the justification end and how do we quantify that final justification?        
One key feature of moral inquiry from a practical ethical position, is the idea 
that many people do not employ specific philosophical frameworks or think in 
abstract philosophical terms when making moral choices.  Often, it is the moral 
philosopher who provides a theoretical framework to make sense of moral actions, 
real or hypothesized.  While practical ethics also seeks to provide theoretical 
explanations for moral actions, it does so by investigating “real world” interactions 
and decisions.  That is, of course not to say that moral philosophers do not and have 
not examined ‘real-word’ moral dilemmas, but rather that they often seem to eschew 
the agents’ narrative as an important constituent of the meaning-making of moral 
issues.  The result, all too often, is for philosophers to produce the hypothetical 
counter example, and while useful in moving a complex philosophical argument 
forwards, says precious little about the lived moral considerations of regular folk. 
  By contrast, a practical ethical approach often resonates with moral agents 
since the moral questions they explore are the same moral questions they face in their 
everyday life.  In this sense, it becomes critical to ask, what, in a person’s complex 
and often fractured experience, is relevant to their overall moral decision-making 
framework.  This is the specific question I focus on in my consideration of sport as 
stories people tell and reflect upon.   
Implicit in this suggestion that sporting narratives can do moral work, is the 
recognition that, narratives themselves are indeed crucial in the expression and 
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formulation of both identity and moral questions; a claim that I support throughout 
the entirety of this project. 
  
Sporting Narratives and Every-day Moral Deliberation 
One of the assignments required of the students I taught in a class at the 
University of Tennessee called, Sport in American Society, was to write a ‘critical 
sport autobiography’.  An important aim of the assignment was to challenge the 
students to articulate the meaning and importance of sports in their lives. A further 
aim of the assignment was for each student to pay particular attention to issues of 
access (to particular sporting opportunities) and support for their sporting choices.  
Over the ensuing semesters and later at San Jose State University where a similar 
assignment was required for a class called, Sport in America, it has become evident 
that, for some students, the impact of sport, broadly defined, has indeed been 
profound and life altering.  For many of the students, the assignment provides an 
opportunity to look beyond the common-sense articulations about the value of sport 
and explore, in a more profound and critical way, how sport has informed and shaped 
who they are and who they would like to be.   
Reflecting on a similar class assignment, Liberti (2004), argues for the value 
of utilizing these so-called “narratives of self” (p. 190). Liberti claims that, “the 
storytelling characteristics of these narratives [of self] privilege the author’s voice as 
a way to more fully investigate the complexities of the social world” (p. 190).  For 
Liberti, the assignment offers an opportunity for her students to wrestle with the 
theories introduced in class and attempt to weave them into their self narrative; not in 
 7
an explicit way but rather, as Liberti says, “I wanted to read theory between the lines 
of text where their voices held prominence” (p. 192).   I argue the stronger, yet related 
claim throughout this paper, that these stories of self, among other kinds of stories, 
help to shape and guide one’s moral deliberations.  Moreover, as one of the practical 
strategies I elaborate on in Chapter 6, the exploration of moral issues in student 
authored sport autobiographies (or autoethnograpy) could prove quite fruitful.      
Many white students at the University of Tennessee, for example, indicated 
that the experience of participating in sports with black athletes, in the often racially 
polarized South, helped to challenge their assumptions and stereotypes about African-
Americans in general and, perhaps more importantly, provide an experiential reality 
that could be appealed to when beginning to challenge family members who 
maintained an overtly (or covertly) racist perspective. In addition, many of the 
students claimed to have continued to maintain lasting friendships with their 
teammates well beyond the scope of athletic contests.  
While the notion that sports can bridge the ‘racial divide’ seems trite and 
woefully (and problematically) naïve, the fact remains that many of the students’ 
narrative of self seemed to address this very issue.  Moreover, several students’ 
autobiographies (importantly) hinted at more complex and nuanced understanding of 
racial dynamics of participation with people from different racial or cultural 
backgrounds.  One student in particular, reasoned that while sport can indeed provide 
a location to temporarily set aside racial differences, it’s what happens when the 
stadium lights are turned off that is perhaps infinitely more important.  The veneer of 
equality on the field is shattered with a quick drive through the downtown of the 
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major southern city where this student lived; a city where the divide between the have 
and have-nots seemed to be significantly, though certainly not exclusively, mediated 
by race.   
For this student in particular, it was important to stay vigilant about the reality 
of racial inequality and to his potential perpetuation of that inequality especially if he 
patted himself on the back for having ‘dealt with his racial’ issues because he played 
on an interracial high school football team. 
Many of the African American students expressed a similar experience of 
reformation of expectations as it related to their white teammates.  In these particular 
instances, the students’ participation in sport helped to transcend certain problematic 
ideas the white students held regarding the black students and vise versa.  Of course, 
many of the black students also reflected on how their sporting experiences only 
served to retrench their understanding of how “stacked” the system is against them 
and that while accomplishments on the field were met with praise and modest 
accolades, once the playing days were over, their “utility” was greatly diminished.      
In these cases, I would suggest that, for certain students; sport has helped 
them to hold significantly more enlightened moral perspectives in that these sporting 
experiences seemed to provide a kind of moral conduit to the recognition of marked 
and unmarked prejudice.  I will elaborate on the concept of the moral conduit below, 
but for now, it will be sufficient to say that I am advocating a position that recognizes 
the multiplicity of elements that go into the moral decision making process.  
Moreover, as I argue in the following chapters, the notion of the moral conduit that I 
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am suggesting also serves to “democratize” the ways that many narrative ethicists 
have addressed the idea of using stories to inform moral philosophical deliberations.  
As concrete “every-day” examples of sporting narrative and moral 
deliberation, it is certainly instructive to relate the morally relevant autobiographies of 
these students. Indeed, the numerous examples I found embedded in the student 
papers helped me to better articulate the importance and positive moral influence of 
sport in my own life story, and thus situate myself in the larger project.  
Of course, it would be naïve (and indeed problematic) to overlook the 
countless examples of morally questionable practices found within the world of 
athletic participation.  The academic journals are rightly bursting with an abundance 
of critical articles interrogating the intersection of sport and the perpetuation of a 
number of troubling social injustices.  Racial tension and prejudice, homophobia, 
gender inequality, class discrimination, essentialization of ethnic groups, and ableism, 
to name a few of these injustices, are and should continue to be at the forefront of the 
scholarly work being done in the academic space of sport studies.  By carefully 
keeping these issues sharply in focus, and while not naively extolling the oft cited 
mantra that ‘sport builds character’, I will examine in a nuanced way, the intricacies 
of sport and identity formation on the one hand and how a moral agent can view sport 
as cultural text as through the lens of narrative ethics on the other.    
With that said, I am in no way overlooking the negative implication of sport, 
nor am I advocating an uncritical representation of sport participation as a paragon of 
virtue.  However, in the final analysis, I think it can be enlightening to investigate the 
stories of those who do claim that sport has provided a particular purchase on certain 
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larger social phenomenon on the one hand and on one’s moral deliberations on the 
other.  Considering both the popularity and impact of sport in North American and 
global contexts and the rates of participation at all levels of sport in these locations, it 
seems worthwhile to dig a little deeper into this issue. 
   What follows is a brief account and discussion of my own sporting 
experiences.  By providing an account of my “sporting narrative” I hope to 
accomplish several goals.  First, I hope that this brief account foreshadows the 
methodology of the case studies that follow in this dissertation.  When talking about 
the efficacy of stories for moral purposes, it seems to me that the vehicle of the story 
(as presented in the case studies) provides a logical if not powerful example of 
practice and theory. Second, it is my aim to sketch out the contours of what a 
practical application of evaluating sporting narratives (in this case, sport as 
autobiography, as introduced above) for moral purposes looks like.  It is perhaps 
important to mention that my conception of ‘moral purposes’ is deliberately broad 
and decidedly agent-referential.  In this way, following the bottom-up particularist 
ethical perspective that Beauchamp (2003) has articulated, a moral agent may more 
usefully define what constitutes a moral deliberation.  In this way, while moral issues 
can be notoriously difficult to pin down, often upon reflection, a person ‘knows it 
when they see it.’1   Moreover, with this autobiography, I aim to demonstrate, by 
example, the ways in which autobiographies can be deployed for moral purposes 
without excessive theorizing.  This purpose is important if, as I claim throughout the 
 
1 Mimicking (though not unproblematicly) Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s famous concurring 
opinion in a 1964 obscenity trail that revolved around definitions of pornography.  
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balance of this dissertation, sport stories can carry moral weight in the same way as 
certain literature has been argued to.  One brings more, or less, of their analytical 
tools to the dissection of their story, yet, as I argue, we depend on stories to frame 
moral questions nonetheless.  A final purpose of incorporating my autobiographical 
sport story, is to emphasize, as I do in Chapter 4, that one need not be a world class 
athlete in order to incorporate these experiences, among others, into a moral decision 
making framework.   
Ride to live, live to ride:2A brief autobiographical journey. 
I have been active in some type of sport since I was a young boy.  From 
soccer and wrestling in my youth, to cross country, football and wrestling in high 
school, to rugby and bicycle racing in college, and bicycle racing at the master’s level 
today. So, it seems fair to say, that sport and physical activity (in one form or another) 
have been a central part of my life.  While I have participated in sport at many 
different levels, I did not think seriously about the meaning of my participation until I 
entered graduate school at Ohio University in the fall of 1989. 
The significance of this ongoing process of reflection cannot be overstated.  
Buttressed, no doubt, by my first experience living away from home, my participation 
in sport began to take on new, and decidedly more profound, importance.  But, in 
order to make sense of this reckoning, it will be important to recognize the life-
context in which it took place. 
 
2 This motto is often associated with Harley-Davidson motorcycle owners however, it seems fitting to 
appropriate the slogan and apply it to my experience with bicycles. 
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Until my early and later adulthood, my participation in sports, while never 
coerced, did not seem to be completely within the scope of my control.  By this I 
mean that my participation in sports were, upon reflection, profoundly linked to the 
participation of similar sports by my two older brothers.  As the last of four children, 
it is not surprising, I suppose, that I revered my older brothers and sister, and looked 
to their lead in matters of athletic participation.  As youngsters, we three boys3 were 
encouraged to participate in a variety of informal and organized sports.  When I was 4 
years old, our family moved from my birth city of Champaign, Illinois to the small 
rural town of Salisbury, Maryland on Maryland’s Eastern Shore.  But this tale of 
displacement is actually (and importantly) once-removed as my parents grew up, met, 
married and had my three siblings in upstate New York.   
It is important to note that both of my parents grew up in variously in-tact 
Italian/American families.  My father’s family was perhaps more “assimilated’ than 
my mother’s family even though the ties to the homeland were deep for each. My 
paternal grandfather arrived from Italy with no English language skills and even less 
material wealth.  My father’s mother was born in Italy and moved to the US while 
very young.  Upon meeting at the boarding house that my paternal great-great 
grandparent’s operated, my grandmother taught my grandfather how to read and write 
in English.  They eventually got married and moved to the upstate New York village 
of Canastota where my grandfather got a job working for the railroad.  Canastota is a 
small rural town about 30 miles outside of Syracuse.  The town is home to a large 
 
3 It is important to note that my sister was seldom encouraged to participate.  Her involvement in 
extracurricular activities was centered on music and dance.  This clearly gendered ‘segregation’ is 
important in my gender role formation but space prohibits a deeper explication at this time.  
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Italian/American population. In the past, it was an important stop along the Erie canal 
as well as a major east-coast center for onion production.  Interestingly enough, today 
Canastota is the home to the international boxing hall of fame, no doubt due to the 
fact that two former world title holders, Carmen Basillio and Billy Backus (Basillio’s 
nephew) both hailed from the town of 5,000 residents. 
My mother grew up in the village of Solvay, which is essentially an urban 
“neighborhood” in the shadow of the city of Syracuse.  My grandmother on my 
mother’s side was born in America but soon moved back to Italy while still an infant.  
At age 21, she moved back to the United States after realizing that, by virtue of her 
birth, she was indeed a naturalized citizen.  My maternal grandfather immigrated to 
the United States when he was 18.  He was from a desperately poor family in Italy 
and, following the lead of other family members, thought he would have a better 
chance at scraping out a living in the US.  He immigrated to the United States in the 
early 1900’s and initially settled with family members in Chicago, Illinois.  
Interestingly enough, both of my maternal grandparents grew up only a few miles 
from each other in Italy so it did not come as much of a surprise when the idea began 
to be voiced that my grandmother should “meet” my grandfather when she arrived 
from Italy several years after his arrival.     
In what was basically an “arranged marriage”, my grandparents were 
introduced and married very quickly.  In Solvay, unlike in Canastota, one was much 
more likely to find in-tact ethnic enclaves.  From Russian, to Polish, to Irish, and 
Italian, the neighborhoods of each group were immediately distinct from each other.  
Even today, to take a trip around the village, the ethnic legacy is readily apparent.  In 
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the Irish section of town, for example, the traffic signal on top of Tipperary Hill has 
the green signal at the top rather than the traditional red signal as the red signal on top 
was thought to represent the British oppression in Ireland.  In fact, there is even a 
sculpture to commemorate the early residents who threw rocks at the signal when the 
city would try to correct this transgressive act.     
Language, dress, and community activities were reasonably separate and the 
necessity of interacting with the “Americans” was rather limited.  The community, in 
my mom’s case the Italian community, provided everything one needed to get by.  
The value of assimilation in my mother’s family was rather small compared to my 
father’s upbringing.  My mother, and to a lesser degree her older brothers, served as 
the intermediary between the “American” world and that of the Italian residents of 
Solvay.        
So, the move(s) from Syracuse to Champaign to Salisbury served to sublimate 
in a particular way, the “importance” of ethnic identity in my family.  While both my 
mother and father were comfortable living, working and socializing within the 
relatively intact Italian/American communities of their upbringing, my father always, 
even if it remained unspoken, thought that his Italianess would “hold him back” 
(especially in the world of higher education) in an inexplicable way. While the choice 
to move was not easy, it was always represented as a grand opportunity and thus, 
mythologized.  What remained unconsidered, as one might expect, is how this shift 
would play out on the identities and identifications of my parent’s children.  In other 
words, while the expectation to understand the nuanced particularities of our 
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Italian/American ethnicity were never lessened, the context for that understanding 
was only accessed in fleeting moments on our pilgrimages to upstate New York.   
The reason this ethnicity-disconnect is so figural, in my mind, is that it helped 
to cement a gnawing drive to “fit in.”  This drive would lead me to follow rather than 
lead…because, in retrospect, I felt in-between two worlds:  One I did not fully belong 
to and one I was not fully accepted by.  
Of course there were just enough remnants of ethnic identity to be roundly 
ostracized in the small community of Salisbury where crabbing, oyster tonging, and 
raising chickens was a way of life for generations of Eastern Shore residents.  Having 
a grandma visit who didn’t speak a whole lot of English, being Catholic, and 
persistently ( and stubbornly) calling white sandwich bread (such as Wonder) 
“American bread” probably didn’t do us any favors either! 
One of my early memories of our relocation was the excitement surrounding 
our new house, and more importantly in my four-year-old mind, the accompanying 
“huge” corner lot on which it was situated!  Indeed, as the years passed, our yard 
became the default neighborhood multipurpose field of play.  From freeze-tag and 
Frisbee to basketball, softball, soccer and even a makeshift skateboard park, our 
backyard was the center of physical activity for several blocks. 
As mentioned previously, as the fourth of four children (with a span of only 
five and a half years between us) I suppose it was not unusual that I looked to emulate 
my siblings in most activities, with physical activity being no exception.  While I was 
content to follow in the sporting footsteps of my older brothers and to a lesser degree 
my older sister, it was not until college that I had a “crisis of conscience” about my 
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unreflective adherence to the athletic path laid before me by my next oldest sibling.  
Up to this point in my athletic endeavors, I had simply participated in the sports that 
my brothers had.   
My participation in wrestling, in hindsight, seemed to be the most 
representative of this long-standing pattern.  As a result of my two older brothers’ 
participation and relative success in high school wrestling, I joined a county program 
in jr. high.  Spurred on by the successes of my two brothers, I wanted to emulate their 
accomplishments, both on and off the mat.  It was evident to me that wrestling 
provided an opportunity for both of my brothers to gain modest acceptance in the 
more popular echelons of high school; this was no small feat as my family were 
ethnic and religious “outsiders” in our predominantly W.A.S.P. community.  More 
than anything, I wanted to belong to this new community and to avoid the difficulties 
fitting in that my siblings had endured.  This assimilation, however, would come at a 
cost, as I would eventually discover. 
At first, my participation in wrestling was exciting.  I had some modest 
success in the county program and went on to make the Varsity team and “letter” in 
my freshman year in high school – no small feat for an insecure and scrawny 120 lb. 
young man who sported huge tinted glasses and an even larger “ethnic afro!” 
However, simply belonging to the team was of great importance to me.  In fact, it was 
becoming clear to me that the social element of wrestling far outstripped my interest 
in the sport in general, and my desire to compete to win in particular.  This revelation 
was but one thing that differentiated my participation in wrestling, and to a large 
degree sport up to this point, from my brothers.   
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My brother Dan, for example, was becoming somewhat of a local legend for 
his ability to pull out a victory from the jaws of defeat on the mats of the local 
tournaments. In fact, the home-town crowds at the regional wrestling matches fully 
expected him to win no matter the score as the end of the third period neared.  Down 
by points on his opponent more often than not, my brother had a unique ability to pull 
off that “one big move” and thus vanquish his opponent.  Upon realizing that this 
approach was more “strategic” than haphazard, the crowd would begin to chant 
“money-move, money-move, money-move” as the match drew to a close.  True to 
form, and almost without exception, Dan would initiate some gracefully acrobatic 
maneuver that, not only caught his opponent off guard, but scored enough points to 
either “decision” or “pin” his rival. 
Of course, as the younger brother trying to follow in these admittedly big 
footsteps, this legacy was anything but great!  In fact, to make matters “worse” my 
sister, while no star athlete, was accomplished in any number of other areas including 
music, dance, and academics.  My sister Michele, for example, would go on to 
graduate from her undergraduate institution in two years and earn her PhD by age 24.  
As if this tradition of academic excellence was not enough, my brother Paul (with 
relatively little fanfare compared to Michele) graduated with a degree in Mathematics 
in three years…what’s an underachiever to do!? 
At that impressionable time, these accomplishments, as great as they may 
have been, objectively were not without a cost.  At the risk of being blunt, my two 
oldest siblings were more a part of the fringe of the social order in high school than 
right smack dab in the middle of the “cool” clique.  On the other hand, Dan’s 
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transformation from angry outsider who used to regularly get into altercations after 
school, to reluctantly accepted jock “hero” seemed to be a more promising template 
for me to follow.  To add fuel to the fire, Dan’s participation in both wrestling and 
football were in direct opposition to my father’s wishes…which of course made these 
choices seem monumentally more enviable.  
So, as it turned out, with neither prior experience, nor a fundamental 
understanding of the game, I signed up for football in the summer preceding my 
sophomore year in high school in order to emulate the person I most looked up to in 
the world: my brother Dan.  Being reasonably athletic and in good shape from youth-
league soccer, wrestling, and cross country the year before, I handled the physical 
rigors of two-a-day practices with relative ease.  Learning the “fundamentals” of a 
proper stance, blocking technique, and tackling form, were also quickly absorbed, no 
doubt, in part to the countless hours of drilling wrestling moves in the county 
program as well as in my freshman year of high school.  With the minor exception 
that I had no idea about the larger strategies of the game of football, things were 
going pretty well!  Another thing that became evident to me was the fact that most of 
the “cool” people in high school, played football. You can bet that that had a far 
greater appeal than any “x’s” or “o’s” the coach could scrawl on the chalkboard! 
The good feeling about my newfound “passion” for the mysterious game of 
football ended rather abruptly one sweltering August evening:  the first day of full 
contact affectionately known as “hitting practice”… 
One would think that a horribly snapped tibia and fibula (think Joe Thiesman 
here) would be enough to keep any reasonably intelligent person who never played an 
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organized game of football in their life to give up on the sport…but you would be 
wrong.  Not only did I go on to play football the following two years, but the in the 
Fall of the year that I broke my leg I returned to the wresting mat only to break my 
collarbone in my first match back!  As traumatic as this might seem, to me it was 
emblematic of how important it was becoming to be considered “popular” as my 
passion for both of these sports had suffered a serious blow (no pun intended). 
Not surprisingly, as a result of being on the team(s), I was experiencing a level 
of popularity that my siblings could not fathom yet I still looked up to my brother 
Dan as the template of how to fit in and be accepted by ones peers.  Unfortunately for 
me (and tragically for my brother Dan), part of the blueprint of fitting in on the 
Eastern Shore of Maryland, world headquarters of Purdue chickens, was to 
party…hard.  If I thought I could gain acceptance by playing sports, then I could gain 
serious insider status if I hung out with and drank with the “really popular” kids at my 
school.   
And so it began; my focus on both sports and school were certainly 
overshadowed by my interest (and enthusiasm) in socializing.  As one might expect, 
male sport teams seemed to be a veritable haven for those with similar “interests.”   
Of course you don’t get the luxury of hindsight and, therefore, it was impossible to 
recognize how potentially destructive my behavior could be.  For awhile (through the 
first several years of college), the subculture of partying - for lack of a better way to 
describe it - was far more important than any character building lesson a coach could 
teach – the irony was not lost on me.  But the influence of the lifestyle, coupled with 
my utter unreflective admiration of my older brother Dan would lead to a series of 
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choices that eventually helped me to see beyond the myopic scope of my social 
choices. 
When I went to college (in Salisbury, living at home), I once again followed 
in my brother’s footsteps and joined the wrestling team.  Dan was beginning to 
achieve some collegiate success (he would eventually place in the top-five at the 
Division III national championships) and, despite my festering near-hatred of the 
sport,  I began going to practice.  It was clear to me that my heart was not in it and in 
fact, I began to dread the end of the day as it meant slogging through another 
practice!  After one particularly brutal practice I came home dejected and tossed my 
gear down on the floor in disgust.  My mother, who was sitting at the kitchen table, 
asked what was wrong and I proceeded to explain how much I hated wrestling 
practice and that my heart just was not in it.  To my astonishment (at the time) she 
replied, “Well, Matt, why don’t you quit if it is unsatisfying?”  Huh??  I had an 
epiphany right there in our kitchen.  “Quit?!”  Wow, the idea did sound rather 
appealing…but wouldn’t that mean that I was a quitter?  It didn’t matter, the 
proverbial weight had been lifted and I never looked back.  The significance was 
rather profound, because, not only had I quit the team, in a very subtle yet meaningful 
way I had made a decision that was, for once, in my best interest.  Yet I had 
participated in some kind of organized sport since I was in grade school so the 
thought of not practicing, while liberating on the one hand, was disconcerting on the 
other.  With this notion in the back of my mind, I made a significant break with any 
of my siblings and went out for the rugby team at Salisbury State. 
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The sport of rugby was fascinating to me, quick, graceful and 
aggressive…seems I was training my entire life for this sport with a combination of 
soccer, football, and wrestling.  The problem that while I enjoyed learning the 
nuances of the game of Rugby and was beginning to achieve some success being 
named to the “A” side my first season, I was very uncomfortable with the expected 
social involvement that seemed to be as much a part of the tradition of rugby as the 
game itself.  On the surface, it would seem that I would be a “natural” for the social 
aspects of the rugby team consider the primacy of drinking within the landscape of 
the rugby subculture, but there was something decidedly unsettling about the 
expectations of team member as well as the reputation the team had on campus.  It 
was decidedly unflattering at best, and in retrospect, extremely homophobic, 
misogynistic, and destructive at worst.  So with little fanfare, I began to extract 
myself from the rugby community.   
As I reflect back on my rugby experience, it is clear to me that my 
participation on the team was necessarily at odds with my larger belief system even if 
at the time I did not have the theoretical or critical language to best articulate (and 
problematize) the negative messages about masculinity that were being 
communicated within the rugby subculture.  Importantly, for my own personal 
development, the disenchantment and subsequent disengagement with rugby lead me 
to explore my athletic options which in turn lead me, in a rather circuitous way, to 
bicycles.  
I received my first bicycle when I was 18 years old as a high school 
graduation present.  Oddly enough, I had never owned a bicycle before that late date; 
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rather I had been the ‘benefactor’ of various hand-me-down bikes along the way.  
With three older siblings, I suppose it didn’t make much sense to buy another bicycle 
– or so my parents thought.  All the more reason that I cherished my jet black 
Schwinn beach cruiser!  Growing up in a coastal town about 25 miles from Ocean 
City, Maryland the beach style influenced a great deal, from dress, to slang, to athletic 
and social activities so needless to say the cool-factor of the Schwinn cruiser (sans 
chain guard, of course!) was at a premium…that is until my first official bicycle got 
stolen.  What I didn’t know at the time that I have just begun to unravel over the past 
several years is the importance of that larceny; it would be rather figural to my story. 
Having spent the summer between high school and college tossing pizzas on 
the O.C. boardwalk, I figured I would go into my freshman year with a few dollars in 
my hand.  With the theft of my beloved cruiser, however, I was left with a decision to 
make.  Spend what little money I had to replace my cruiser (a relatively inexpensive 
proposition) or, taking after my brother Paul who had just purchased a beautiful 
Peugeot French racing bicycle, spend every last dime I had in order to acquire an 
entry level racing bicycle.  I opted for the later and $450.00 dollars later I was the 
proud owner of a brilliant blue and yellow Trek 12-speed racing bicycle!  
At first, I was happy to just have a bicycle after my cruiser was stolen, but 
after some time, I began to pay more attention to the heretofore unknown world of 
professional bike racing.  In addition, I began to ride my bicycle for “fitness” rather 
than simple utility.  I vividly remember my first serious ride.  When I returned, I 
begged my father to measure the distance in the car and he was more than happy to 
oblige.  13 miles - What an accomplishment, I thought at the time.  I was beginning to 
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consider myself a serious bike rider.  My older brother Paul, with whom I had a close 
relationship, also had a nice bike at the time. He was riding more seriously and in 
fact, had entered a few local races by that point.  While I’m sure his increased 
participation influenced me to continue riding, my newly discovered awareness for 
the sport was due, in large part, to the success of American Greg LeMond on the 
European racing circuit.  
1986 was a watershed year for American cycling.  It was the first year an 
American racer, Greg LeMond, had won the grueling Tour de France.  Raced over 
three weeks and covering more than 2,000, miles the Tour is arguably one of the most 
difficult sporting events on the planet.  I remember being glued to the (minimal) 
television coverage of the race absorbing as much information as possible about 
pacelines, domestiques, time trials, stages, and feed zones.  It was as if I had finally 
found a sporting interest that was exciting and that seemed to match my interests and 
abilities.  I had caught the cycling bug and  was on a crash course to make up for lost 
time by scouring the bicycling magazines, studying the mail order catalogs and 
committing the information on prices, and component weights to memory.   
More importantly, however, was the growing interest and excitement I was 
developing through riding my bike, now up to 20-30 miles through the countryside 
with ease.  Moreover, I was beginning to see myself through the lens of a bike rider; 
as a bike rider.  While I would not become “serious” about riding for several years, I 
found it very exciting to consider myself part of the cycling subculture in a way I had 
never felt in my previous sport experiences.  Road bike racing in Salisbury Maryland 
in the mid to late 1980’s was a relatively novel endeavourer and part of the 
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excitement of my new-found interest in bicycles, I’m certain, was the fact that it was 
a sport outside of the mainstream.  In contrast to the fact that I never felt truly 
accepted in the community, I felt a tremendous pride in being part of what I 
considered to be an exclusive group of ‘serious’ cyclists.  Riding, it seemed to me, 
legitimated my outsider status but on my terms and within the boundaries of an 
activity that I both enjoyed, and would eventually become quite proficient at (and 
locally recognized for).   
As my interest level and ability began to grow, my commitment to cycling 
grew as well.  In this sense, it is with quite a bit of clarity that I recognized that the 
benefits of my interest in the obscure (in America at least) sport of bicycle racing 
extended beyond the excitement of unleashing an explosive sprint at the end of a 
hard-fought 60 mile road race.  Indeed, the change has been far more lasting and one 
that seemed in stark contrast to my previous “dedication” to self-destructive 
socializing.   
The moment was almost epiphanic.  I had been training all summer and had 
been participating, with some success, in local cycling events around the region.  I 
had eventually purchased a lightweight Cannondale bicycle and was beginning to 
take the sport seriously.  However, on the eve of one of the big racing events of the 
summer, I decided to accompany some friends to a favorite beach spot: Trader Lee’s 
Beer Garden!  In summers past, I had been a regular at the outdoor beach party and, 
in fact, had roomed with two of the bartenders that worked there.  Trader Lee’s was 
an Ocean City institution.  It was an outdoor beach party held within a fenced-in 
structure.  The only beverages served at Trader Lee’s were beer and for the brave 
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among the crowd, Maddog 20/20-a ‘fortified wine product’- which amounted to a 36 
proof flavored wine.  On previous outings to this notorious gathering which took 
place on Saturday nights during the high-intensity summer season, the question was 
not if you would drink, but rather how much.  However, on this particular pre-race 
occasion I reluctantly agreed to join my friends and did something that was 
unheralded at the time: refrain from joining in the festivities.   
Buoyed (at first) by my new-found dedication to cycling and my 
unwillingness to compromise my chances in Sunday’s race, I remained drink-free in 
an increasingly intoxicating crowd.  What was immediately evident to me was how 
out of place I felt and how simultaneously uncomfortable I made others feel simply 
by my casual non-participation.  As the night wore on, I began to see for the first time 
with unprecedented clarity the destructive nature of the lifestyle that my fellow 
college students and I took for granted.  From verbal and physical confrontations, to 
alcohol poisoning, to a blatant violation of personal boundaries, the behavior was 
nothing short of shocking.  I started to feel very uncomfortable on the one hand as the 
odd-duck yet on the other hand, I felt completely empowered by my ability, as 
facilitated by my commitment to cycling, to simply choose not to participate in the 
problematic behavior of the beach party.  I became annoyed, at first by the idiotic 
actions of the crowd in general and of my friends in particular, but the disappointment 
quickly turned inward as I began to clearly recognize that I was choosing to let this 
form of socialization profoundly define who I was.  I was at a crossroads.  I don’t 
remember how I did in the race the next day and in the end, it really does not matter. 
What I will always remember is the feeling of anxiety over knowingly making a 
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series of unpopular decisions that would certainly serve to alienate me from one set of 
friends, yet open me up in an important way to another.   
The transition from the “follower” of my past is certainly not one that would 
take place on a particular summer night in West Ocean City, but in fact that transition 
is an ongoing process of reflection, reflexive introspection and facing up to hard 
truths about one’s foibles, biases, and privileges– but it is a process that, for me at 
least, is and has been significantly intertwined with my love of cycling and my patent 
desire to become in all its simplicity and elegance: better. 
 
Overview of This Project 
In the next chapter, I offer a brief overview of narrative ethics, explaining 
what it is and how it differs from other ethical approaches. Further, I will show that 
sport can be treated and interpreted as stories and, therefore, read, following the 
narrative ethics position, as possible moral vehicles.  In Chapter 3, I specifically 
highlight what kind of moral work sporting narratives can do by paying attention to 
the work of prominent narrative ethicists.  Further, I lean on Nelson’s (2001) concept 
of the counterstory to work past many of the criticisms of these narrative positions.  
Moreover, I will answer the objection that sporting narratives are too simple and 
unsophisticated to do any significant moral work. I briefly In Chapter 4 and 5, I 
explain what I mean by a sporting narrative and introduce two different types of 
sporting narratives; sport as autobiography and sport as reflexive narrative.  What’s 
more, I look at two particular case studies for each type of narrative, and focus on 
how each throws light on our moral life.  In the final chapter, I sketch out a model for 
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the utilization of sport stories for moral ends as applied in a practical setting as well 
as offer some conclusions and recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
NARRATIVE ETHICS AND SPORT-AS-TEXT:   
MAKING THE CASE 
 
 
 Scholars from disciplines as diverse as sport studies, practical ethics, 
education and psychology have begun to consider the value of exploring narrative, in 
its various forms, as an important window on people’s attempt to come to grips with 
their lived experiences.  Recently, for example, the traditionally quantitative 
disciplines of athletic training (Pittney & Parker, 2002) and (to a lesser degree) the 
emerging interdisciplinary field of sport science (Hunger & Thiele, 2000; Stelter, 
Sparks, & Hunger, 2003), and sport psychology (Stean & Roberts, 1992; Krane, 
Anderson, & Stean, 1997; Strean, 1998) have made implicit calls for research 
utilizing qualitative methodologies.  This shift in recognition of non-quantitative 
research paradigms is significant in that it represents a tacit understanding that 
“stories” (at least) in terms of qualitative interviews, thickly described ethnographies, 
participant observation, and autoethnographies, provide a unique insight into the 
meaning of various social phenomena for any number of social actors.  Moreover, the 
recognition, through research (as codified in both subject and method) of sporting 
practices serves to legitimate4 the value of exploring the meaning of sport from an 
individual, cultural, and societal perspective. 
The turn to narrative, however, has not been without its share of difficulties.  
As has been the case with various paradigm shifts (e.g., the quantitative to qualitative 
shift in the social sciences for instance), the academic wrangling over acceptable 
 
4 An ongoing ‘battle’ in the sport studies disciplines.  
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criteria for both subject and method is certainly a contentious matter. Maxwell 
(2004), for example, argues that the reemergence of a more scientifically based 
research (and the subsequent appeal to “science” as a measure of, worth, rigor, and 
validity) has challenged the value of qualitative research on the one hand, and pushed 
qualitative researcher to feel compelled to demonstrate a sufficiently scientific 
orientation while potentially abandoning, or at least sublimating, certain important 
qualitative perspectives.  To be fair, Maxwell also argues that the tendency for 
qualitative researchers to essentialize scientific research has seemingly perpetuated 
the chasm between the two branches of inquiry (2004).  But my intent here is not to 
rehash this controversy, but rather to put narrative ethics to use to explore the moral 
potential of popular forms of culture like sport.   
In this chapter, I make the case that sporting narratives are ethically valuable 
and, therefore, worth investigating.  Moreover, I wish to expand the type of stories 
that narrative ethicists have typically culled as valuable for moral purposes.  But the 
task of expanding the boundaries of narrative ethics and integrating sport stories 
requires first that I say something about the emerging trends in narrative discourse in 
general, and about narrative ethics in particular. 
 
Trends in Narrative Discourse 
As Hayden White (1986) provocatively claims in his book, The Content of 
the Form, “to raise the question of the nature of narrative is to invite reflection on the 
very nature of culture and, possibly, even on the nature of humanity itself” (p. 1).  
Indeed, as White and others have endeavored to wrestle with the “relationship 
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between narrative discourse and historical representation” (p. ix) what has become 
evident over the past 20 or so years is the increasing academic attention focused on 
stories.  Moreover, as Bochner (2001) in arguing for the value of qualtitative research 
that utilizes a narrative approach observed:  
The narrative turn moves from a singular, monolithic conception of social 
science tword a pluralism that promotes multiple forms of representation and 
research: away from facts and toward meanings; away from master narratives 
and toward local stories: away from idolizing categorical thought and 
abstracted theory and toward embracing the values of irony, emotionality, and 
activism; away from assuming the stance of disinterested spectator and toward 
assuming the posture of a feeling, embodied, and vulnerable observer; away 
from writing essays and toward telling stories.  (2001, pp. 134-135)   
However, the recognition that profound human meaning can be crafted and 
expressed through narrative discourse has become a battleground for shifting 
epistemological arguments.  This debate on the value of investigating narratives is 
not, of course, limited to the disciplines of sport studies or philosophy.  In fact, there 
seems to be a ‘narrative turn’ conversation in many academic disciplines.  
Educationists like Maxine Green (1995), Carol Witherell (1991), and Nel Noddings 
(1998), for example, have vigorously advocated for an educational perspective that 
takes seriously the lives, expressed through narrative and dialogue, of both the teacher 
and student. 
Educational philosopher Nel Noddings (1998), for instance, suggests that 
stories can be used as the “starting point for critical thinking and the philosophical 
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study of morality and ethics” (p. 163).  She advocates that the careful integration of 
particular stories within the curriculum can help to foster critical (and moral) thinking 
in general.  Moreover, Noddings argues for “their [stories] episodic use-the use of 
particular stories to encourage self-examination and reflection on a specific social or 
ethical issue” (p. 163).  While Noddings goes on to say that the use of stories for 
moral and ethical purposes is not a new phenomenon, indeed the adaptation of stories 
for moral, religious, or educational purposes has a long history. 
The move toward narrative research in education (as in other fields) was not 
with out its own set of problems, however, as Blumenreich (2004) suggests.  She 
argues that the rise of interest in narrative inquire in the field of education in the past 
several decades, is a decided “reaction against positivism” (p. 78).  She goes on to 
argue that, “narrative researchers began to feel that positivistic education research, 
with its aspirations to being ‘scientific’, was elitist because it treated the informants as 
mere objects of investigation” (p. 78).  So, in the same way that qualitative research 
in general has been a reaction against positivistic paradigms, narrative research itself 
was undergoing scrutiny from within with the theoretical intervention of 
poststructuralist thinking (Blumenreich, 2004).   
Likewise, literary critics, sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists, 
among others have defended the value of studying narratives against a host of 
detractors.  Moreover, each of the (above mentioned) disciplines have assimilated a 
narrative approach into both the subject and method of research.  Unfortunately, the 
arguments for or against the value of narrative may have less to do with good 
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scholarship and more to do with “territorial marking”5.  As the academy becomes 
(slowly) diversified, alternative theoretical perspectives have been posited.  The 
interventions by women, people of color, gay, lesbian and transgendered people, and 
the multitude of others who constitute "social difference", have expanded/exploded 
the boundaries of academic discourse.  Make no mistake however, these seemingly 
benign theoretical forays have had very real political implications both within and 
outside the university.  Often the stamp of approval by the larger academy is hard to 
come by, thus rendering a great deal of innovative and vibrant work as marginal6. 
 It is for exactly the above mentioned retrenchment that I argue the “turn 
toward narrative” is and has been crucial since meaning is profoundly constructed, 
reconstructed, and deconstructed by the stories we tell about ourselves, others, and 
the world we inhabit.  Through stories, we are better able to engage in a constructive 
dialogue about alternative perspectives and ways of knowing.  Furthermore, in 
arguing for the value of examining narratives in his book, Interpretive Interactionism, 
Denzin (2001) states: 
 Everything we study is contained within a storied or narrative representation.  
 The self is a narrative production.  There is no separation between self and 
 society.  Material social conditions, discourses, and narrative practices 
 interweave to shape the self and its many identities.  Narrative’s double duty 
 is complex, and self and society are storied productions (pp. 58-59). 
 
5 I use this term purposively as it conveys a particular masculinist response to the encroachment of 
competing "ways of knowing". 
 
6 While space prohibits an in-depth exploration of these dynamics, I think it important to recognize and 
name the intellectual "othering" that often creates barriers to alternative, non-mainstream perspectives. 
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So for Denzin and other social scientists, narratives offer rich sites for the excavation 
of the motives and actions of both the community and of the individual at one and the 
same time.   
 Similarly, Butryn and Masucci (2003), in their investigation of Tour de France 
champion Lance Armstrong, have articulated the value of this “reorientation toward 
narrative inquiry” (p. 126), as it relates to examining the experiences of athletes and 
go on to claim that: 
 By investigating the stories that athletes tell about themselves, researchers 
 have been better able to understand the actions, motives, and conflicting 
 identifications that impact and form an athlete’s experience.  Critical narrative 
 approaches have helped sport studies researchers begin to make sense of the 
 implications of "managing" multiple identifications against more traditional 
 social expectations.  Furthermore, narrative research that foregrounds the 
 athlete's perspective, interpretation and evaluation of their own experiences, 
 has helped to facilitate a reconsideration of seemingly common-sense ideas 
 about technology, masculinity, race, class, ability and sexual orientation. (pp. 
 126-127) 
 Moreover, the power of stories, and counterstories as Nelson (2001) has 
suggested, can help to reconceptualize the taken-for-granted assumptions about 
relationships of power, for instance.  With these transformative considerations in 
mind, I will return to a discussion of counterstories in Chapter 4 as I feel they can be 
a great help in arguing for certain types of stories; these are stories that help to recast 
the oppressed as “respectworthy moral agents” (Nelson, 2001, p. 7) But now I will 
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turn my attention to the relatively new discourse of narrative ethics.  As I have stated 
in the preface, this project represents an attempt to meld elements from across various 
academic disciplines however; the foundation of this project owes considerable 
recognition to the possibilities stimulated by this emerging ethical paradigm.           
 
Narrative Ethics 
 Narrative ethics as an ethical approach has begun to garner attention in a small 
but vibrant body of literature that has begun to emerge over the past few decades 
(Nelson, 2001).  While there is no agreed upon definition of narrative ethics, nor any 
one academic discipline that can lay claim to it, many scholars concur that a central 
tenant of narrative ethics is the idea that narratives “figure importantly into the moral 
life” (Nelson 2001, p. 36).  Moreover as Nelson elaborates, narrative ethics, “accords 
a central role to stories” (p. 36).  But what does it mean to say that narratives figure 
into the moral life?  Nelson (1997, 2001) claims that, from a philosophical 
perspective, it often means assigning moral significance to stories, not simply as 
examples or illustrations (although these are legitimate uses of stories for moral 
purposes as well as for narrative ethics), but rather as a “necessary means to some 
moral end” (p. 36).  For example, Martha Nussbaum, whose position I will later 
examine, is interested in exploring the role of “artistically sophisticated fiction in 
developing moral perception” (Nelson, 2001, p. 37).  The important point here is that 
for narrative ethicists, morality is often tied inextricably to stories.  While I am 
sympathetic to Nelson’s position that stories are necessary to achieve some moral 
 35
end, I argue below, that if stories in general can be morally uplifting, sport stories 
ought to be included among the kind of stories culled for moral purposes.  To be sure, 
both Nelson (1997, 2001) and Murray (1997) suggest multiple uses of stories for 
moral purposes and it is this trajectory I pursue throughout the remainder of this 
dissertation.  
Murray (1997) also suggests that narratives have significant moral value.  He 
contrasts the way that certain narratives are utilized for moral purposes on the one 
hand and twentieth-century "propositional" moral philosophy on the other.  It is clear 
to see the inherent tension between many more traditional ethical philosophical 
systems, founded on a set of irrefutable logical propositions, and an ethical system  
instantiated on certain iterations of narrative ethics that can seem relativistic due to 
their context specificity.  However, according to Murray and other narrative ethicists, 
the lived experiences of moral agents are complex and nearly impossible to reduce to 
a universal (Kantian) moral calculus.  What is ironic, according to Murray (and I 
concur), is that many of these “propositional ethicists” rely significantly on stories 
and narrative examples to buttress their arguments, seemingly acknowledging the 
usefulness of the narrative genre to help frame and articulate moral questions. 
Murray (1997) goes on to articulate four possible answers to the question 
“what is narrative ethics?” (p. 6).  The first answer Murray gives is that narratives can 
be used as “moral education” (p. 6).  By this, Murray explains that often the stories 
we are told (as children) are meant to shape and mold us in particularly moral ways.  
Many kinds of stories, in this view, are like the “propositionlike maxims that we are 
given as children” (p. 6) such as, ‘do not kill’ for example.  Many people, Murray 
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reasons, learn much of what they know about morality from these types of narratives.  
While the former point does not seem particularly controversial, detractors have 
claimed that these stories, while important for getting at moral and ethical content, are 
not content in and of themselves but rather heuristic devices designed to “represent 
the content of morality” (p. 7) in a memorable way.   
Propositional ethicists who may be sympathetic to Murray’s idea that stories 
can be used for moral education purposes share a concern that these stories in and of 
themselves, are not necessarily an “essential element” (p. 7) as he claims when 
sketching out the detractor’s view.  However, in addressing this charge, Murray posits 
suggests that, it is crucial to “give narrative(s) an important substantive role in ethics” 
(p. 7).   
The second answer to the question posited by Murray about the nature of 
narrative ethics, and one that directly addresses the issue he raised concerning the 
substantive role of narrative in ethical discourse is “narrative as moral methodology” 
(p. 7-8).  This perspective, says Murray, is important in many types of practical 
ethical applications such as bioethics (Murray’s field of expertise). Often called 
casuistry, this ‘method’ involves, “case-centered moral reasoning” (p. 8).  Narratives 
as represented in case stories are important, says Murray, in developing moral 
reasoning.  The salient feature of casuistry based ethical systems is that they are not 
dependent on propositional moral logic to define right and wrong, but rather, the 
moral value is to be found within the interpretation of the story itself and thus open to 
change.  Or, as Murray summarizes, “the moral content, that is, resides in the case; 
the propositions we draw from it are interpretations of the content” (p. 8).  Moreover, 
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as Jonsen and Toulmin (1988) point out, the crux of the “moral experience” (p. 314)  
does not lie in general moral rules and principles but rather in the:  
(W)isdom that comes from seeing how the ideas behind those rules work out  
in the course of people’s lives:  in particular, seeing more exactly what is  
involved in insisting on (or waiving) this or that rule in one or another set of  
circumstances. (p. 314) 
The third answer to the question, “what is narrative ethics” posited by Murray 
is, “narrative as an appropriate form of moral discourse” (p. 9).  Here he is interested 
in positioning narratives, or more correctly, certain types of narratives philosophers 
use, within the landscape of moral philosophy itself.  Moral philosophy is done to a 
greater or lesser degree with stories.  Some of the stories are hypothetical, that is to 
say that they are conventions created by the philosopher usually to “highlight some 
proposition about ethics” (p. 10).  Unlike the narrative in moral method, these stories 
simply serve as a way to put meat on the bones of the propositional frameworks that 
the ethicist is articulating.  But the stories themselves are not content rich, that is to 
say, the power of these stories is in that they (interestingly and ironically) 
demonstrate what the propositions are supposed to show clearly!  By contrast, a 
second type of narrative is often deployed by moral theorists.  The purpose of these 
stories, according to Murray, is that they are intended to, “set up, motivate, [and] 
show the necessity of the approach taken by the theorist” (p. 10).  Similarly, Murray 
asserts that Martha Nussbaum’s work uses narrative to help sharpen moral 
perceptions and thus “enrich our moral discourse” (p. 13).  
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The last response to the question first posed by Murray, what is narrative 
ethics?, attempts to come to terms with the use of narratives in moral justification.  In 
this view, Murray claims that we rely, not on moral propositions to make informed 
moral judgments, but rather on a more “nuanced and complex” (p. 14) understanding 
of what we consider to be right and wrong or good and bad. What, he asks, are the 
“sources of confident knowledge about morality?” (p. 14). It is this instantiation of 
narratives for moral purposes that are most intriguing to me for this project.  In 
explaining the role of stories and narrative in the realm of moral knowledge, he 
makes use of the metaphors of a web and a tapestry.  The web, Murray explains, is 
not a perfect structure and is, perhaps made up of many threads of many different 
sizes, yet, the web when constructed, seems to do (to a greater or lesser degree) what 
it was intended to do.  The tapestry is an even more vivid metaphor as it relates to the 
use of stories for moral purpose.  A tapestry literally is a depiction of many images 
that, “taken together, tell stories” (p.14).  Stories, in this sense, are part of the larger 
tapestry and depict, among other things, “good lives and bad lives, human flourishing 
and its contrary” (p. 14).  Indeed, as Murray indicates, a significant and reliable 
amount of moral knowledge comes to us in the form of stories: stories of kindness, of 
cruelty, of upliftment, and of unspeakable horrors.   
But these stories, when woven into a larger cultural tapestry, says Murray, 
play an important role in defining, refining, and reframing how we consider certain 
moral issues.  By scrutinizing the stories that are prominent in our society, we often 
can look at the “worn and ugly threads” (p. 15) that might be best removed from the 
tapestry as they seem to obfuscate the larger beauty of work.  Put in practical terms, 
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these stories allow us to identify how we have arrived at a particular position on a 
given moral issue.  I’ll discuss the Bobby Riggs/ Billie Jean King match in greater 
detail in Chapter 5, for reading that sporting story allows one to identify the “ugly 
thread” of gender inequality for example.     
If the reader is still left wondering, what is narrative ethics and how is it 
“done”, it is likely because narrative ethicists themselves do not share one particular 
vision.  Rather, as I have alluded to above, there are a number of things that ethicists 
do which draw from narrative work.  It would, of course be prohibitive to examine all 
of the claims that narrativist's have made; however, it will be helpful to look at the 
way that one philosopher, Martha Nussbaum, has suggested using literature for moral 
purposes.  In Love's Knowledge (1990), Nussbaum presents a comprehensive 
collection of essays that explore the limits of ethical work that literature can do.  
Nussbaum, who proclaims a long and intimate relationship to works of fiction, was 
disenchanted with the relative lack of attention that philosophers had paid to the 
profound ethical questions being illuminated by certain works of literature.       
Nussbaum’s central thesis revolves around two claims "about the writer's art that 
seem worth investigating" (1990, p.4).   
The first claim has to do with the form and content of any carefully written 
text.  Nussbaum asserts that there is, "an organic connection between its form and its 
content.  Certain thoughts and ideas, a certain sense of life, reach toward expression 
in writing that has a certain shape and form, that uses certain structures, certain 
terms" (pp. 4-5).  In other words, for Nussbaum, the ideas in a work of literature are 
necessarily bound to the textual expression of those ideas.  Writing that is well done, 
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says Nussbaum, cannot be paraphrased in a "very different form and style", lest it 
surrender the power to express the same conception.  The second, and more important 
claim for her larger project, is concerned with the unique ability of the narrative artist 
"to express certain human truths" (p. 5).  Moreover, Nussbaum (1990) makes the 
stronger declaration, with respect to certain elements of human life, that the terms of 
the novelist's art are, “alert winged creatures, perceiving where the blunt terms of 
ordinary speech or abstract theoretical discourse, are blind, acute where they are 
obtuse, winged where they are dull and heavy” (p. 5).  
So for Nussbaum, there is an important connection to be made between the 
literary text and certain profound moral questions.  In fact, says Nussbaum, “a literary 
narrative of a certain sort is the only type of text that can state them [relevant portions 
of human life] fully and fittingly, without contradiction” (p. 7).  The sum of these two 
claims is that literary narratives are better-suited than philosophical treatises to 
investigate, articulate, and accentuate certain important ethical questions.  It is one 
thing to say that literature highlights significant moral questions and another thing to 
say that reading certain literature can be morally efficacious.  
 The reader moves beyond the domain of philosophical discourse by “allowing 
the author of the work to direct one’s attention to the rich and subtle particulars of the 
narrative-the moral, intellectual, emotional, and social nuances” (Nelson, 2001, p.37).  
It is in this way that the reader can see what is “morally at issue”.  Moreover, having 
refined one’s perceptions of what is at stake morally, through the careful guidance of 
a skilled author, one “can respond to actual others in her own life not merely 
adequately but excellently” (Nelson 2001 p. 38).  In Nussbaum’s words, the reader 
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becomes “finely aware and richly responsible” (Nussbaum, 1990, p.148). Hopefully, 
the general contours of Nussbaum’s narrative ethics are starting to materialize.  To 
sum up, (1) novels get at moral questions that have often been overlooked in 
philosophical discourse;  (2) a competent author can direct the reader’s attention to 
morally relevant issues; (3) the attuned reader, upon having her or his perceptions 
honed, will be better able to act responsibly since she or he will be more “aware” of 
complex ethical dimensions of one’s interactions.  A further benefit of reading well 
written literature is that it allows one the opportunity to push beyond the limits of 
one’s experience in effect broadening his or her moral horizons.  Moreover, the 
author is able to acutely articulate and scrutinize the salient moral features of a 
situation or relationship in ways that are typically not possible in everyday life.  In 
other words, as Nelson sums up:  
If we ourselves are to attain the moral virtuosity that consists in choosing 
exactly the right response to another, we need to see these choices modeled by 
particular characters in particular settings, in the kind of detail that lets us 
appreciate how easy it is to miss something crucial, how hard it is to get it 
right.  (2001, p. 38)   
Nussbaum is exclusively interested in the moral issues that are elaborated in 
novels.  However, she admits that other genres may prove appropriate so long as they 
give sufficient attention to particularity and emotion and “so long as they involve 
their readers in relevant activities of searching and feeling, especially feeling 
concerning their own possibilities” (1990 p. 46).   
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In Love’s Knowledge, Nussbaum (1990) also takes the analytical ethicists to 
task.  Nussbaum claims that the style of modern Anglo-American philosophy, "is 
correct, scientific, abstract, hygienically pallid, a style that seemed to be regarded as a 
kind of all-purpose solvent in which philosophical issues of any kind at all could be 
efficiently disentangled, any and all conclusions neatly disengaged" (p.19).  
Nussbaum, by contrast, suggests that narratives (and sophisticated literature in 
particular) are better able to capture the subtle and crucial nuances of moral 
deliberants.  Moreover, the fact that lives are lived and conceived in terms of a 
narrative structure, says Nussbaum, is a strong case against the antiseptic and 
analytical view of morality argued for by many philosophers.  Of course, Nussbaum's 
work in narrative ethics does not reflect the diversity of positions within the 
discourse; indeed many (myself included) take issue with the considerable amount of 
"cultural capital" one must possess to benefit from the moral influence of the sort of 
high-brow literature that she recommends.  This criticism aside, an important 
implication of Nussbaum's work in particular and narrative approaches to ethics in 
general is the recognition that our moral choices and actions are influenced and 
shaped by stories.   
 Carl Elliot (1999) expands on Nussbaum’s critique of “traditional” moral 
philosophy by appealing to Wittgenstein.  For Elliot, Wittgenstein’s move away from 
a view of “language” as pictured reality to the idea that language is an “altogether 
messier and more complex affair” (p. 123), gives credence to a narrative approach to 
moral philosophy.  It is a mistake, Elliot continues, for “philosophers to try to 
systematize language or to provide some kind of philosophical foundation upon 
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which language can be founded” (p. 134).   Though Elliot is talking about the 
philosophy of language, he argues that moral philosophy is similarly messy.  In other 
words, the attempt to reduce ethics to universal philosophical principles (often 
represented in propositional analytic formulas) is a mistake since the lived 
experiences of moral agents is unique and colored by a multitude of experiences that 
are not captured by such abstract principles.  The moral life, concludes Elliot, is best 
interrogated by the use of literary narrative.  As I suggest below, an expanded 
rendering of “narrative”, one that includes, among other things, sporting stories, can 
only add to the richness of the kind of moral approach that Elliot has advanced. 
 
Sport as Narrative 
There is a rich tradition of telling sporting stories in our culture, from local 
sporting myths to the valorization of certain athletes and the demonizing of others, in 
various newspaper, book, magazine, radio, television, and virtual accounts.  Indeed, 
as Michael Oriard claims in his 1993 book, Reading Football, “it seems obvious that 
every sporting season tells a story to its various fans: tale of hopes fulfilled or 
disappointed, of adversity overcome or unsurmounted, of aging heroics or youthful 
folly or sheer luck triumphant...the numerous plots are familiar” (p. 23).  It is clear 
that sport figures importantly in and as narratives.  Moreover, paying close attention 
to sporting narratives can often reveal insights into larger social and cultural 
meanings.  As Joseph Gusfield (2000) has suggested, “considering sports as a form of 
art, as telling and acting out stories within its own specific form, enables us to 
consider the elements that operate in creating meaning” (p.70).  
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Is there something special about sports in contrast to other activities that lend 
it particularly to the narrative form?  It seems a matter of common sense to suggest 
that sports are different in some significant ways from other activities.  In fact, it is 
the utter familiarity and popularity of sport, I would suggest, that often renders 
serious academic study marginal at best.  Indeed, as John Greenway observed in 
1985, "it is easy for academics to dismiss sport as an "obsession", but when one 
hundred million watched the Super Bowl between the Steelers and the Rams while 
only seventy-three million voted in the presidential election, even the most skeptical 
student of culture has to admit something important is going on" (p. 55).  Taking my 
cue from a cultural studies perspective that advocates not only the study of popular 
culture but also the insistence on making the familiar strange, I maintain that 
undertaking a critical academic exploration of sport is paramount if we wish to better 
understanding our culture, and the moral choices of its inhabitants.  In many ways, it 
is the simultaneous familiarity and separateness from the everyday that make sports 
compelling.       
I am in favor of a popular understanding of sport as a unique activity, in 
contrast to everyday, often mundane, activities.  Sports, in this view are differentiated 
from other activities in important ways by time, space and action for example.  
Sporting activities often occur in specific locations, whether they take place on fields, 
courts or in pools that are created expressly for athletic activities or whether sporting 
activities occur in “secular spaces”7 adapted and/or adopted for sporting exploits.  
 
7 The allusion to religiosity here is purposeful, as there is a growing discourse surrounding the intersection 
of sport and religion; however space prohibits a lengthy treatment.  For a useful introduction of the 
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The fact that we must go to the stadium, tennis court, or the closed off streets of a 
downtown for a bike race, emphasize that “this activity is out of the ordinary” in 
many significant ways.  The understanding of temporality will play an important role 
in the conceptualization of sports as, not only unique, but also as uniquely 
represented through story.  Time plays a similar role in the differentiation of sporting 
activities from the everyday.  Time is often dramatically reframed and reconfigured in 
sporting events8.   
Consider that the 100-meter dash is regularly decided by less than 1/100 of a 
second.  By contrast, a basketball team down by 2 points in the fourth quarter with 10 
seconds on the clock is said to have "all the time in the world".  Of course, it is 
possible to simply (and accurately) make the case that time and space are always 
relative, as in the split-second reaction that results in a fatal car crash or a near miss; 
the difference is that while many people experience time and place/space in a 
multitude of ways, sports purposefully embodies a setting that is generally 
unattainable in day-to-day activities.  Moreover, it is exactly these “non-secular” 
qualities that distinguish sports activities from other more commonplace events and, 
for many people, make them so alluring.  In any event, what seems clear is that 
engaging in sporting activities, whether as a participant or as a spectator, has the 
capacity to suspend the ordinary.  That is not to say that certain characteristics 
commonly associated with sport do not seep into the secular world.  In fact, many 
 
religious dynamic of sport, see Charles Prebish, (1993).  Religion and Sport: The Meeting of the Sacred 
and Profane.  Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
 
8 It is important to note that both spectators and participants can profoundly experience the 
spatial/temporal/behavioral idiosyncrasies of sports.  This point will be crucial in arguing for the move 
from action to narrative. 
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supporters and detractors of sport argue just this case.  The notion of competition for 
example, depending on one’s view, can be assessed in this way.  On the one hand, 
many believe that the spirit of competitiveness that helps the athlete achieve 
particular goals can also be beneficial in the business or political world.  On the other 
hand, there are those who feel that the intense win at all cost ethos so prevalent in 
contemporary sport can have damaging consequences when applied in the non-sport 
settings.  Regardless of one’s perspective, it is apparent that reflecting on either the 
positive or the dubious “value” of sport can and often does create a dialogue on 
morally significant questions: an issue I will revisit in the following chapter. 
Birrell and McDonald (2000) similarly make a strong case for “reading” sport, 
sporting personalities, and media representations of sport as texts in their book, 
Reading sport:  Critical essays on power and representation.  In explaining the 
methodological focus of their edited collection, Birrell and McDonald suggest that:  
Everyone with any interest in sport “reads” sport in some way.  For over a 
century we have had a daily site for the production of sport narratives called 
the sports page, and that central site has been joined over the years by 
television and radio broadcasts and commentary, the increasingly popular 
genre of autobiographies of sporting figures, novels and films set in sport 
settings, web sites devoted to all forms of sport information and dialogue, and 
of course scholarly analyses of the world of sort. (p. 10)  
 According to Birrell and McDonald, reading popular culture “products” 
including sport, is something that many people always-already engage in to a greater 
or lesser degree of sophistication.  The “familiarity” of popular sporting narratives is 
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what gives Birrell and McDonald’s approach its thrust.  Of course, Birrell and 
McDonald advocate for a particular kind of critical reading in order to reveal the 
cultural meanings “that circulate within narratives of particular incidents or 
celebrities” (2000, p. 11).  Importantly for Birrell and McDonald’s project, as well as 
for the present project, the desire to discover the one “true” reading is elusive at best 
and highly problematic at worst since the multiplicity of meaning, whether from a 
cultural or from a moral perspective, can be characterized as a socially bound 
construction; this is a hallmark of postmodern/poststructuralist interpretation to be 
sure.  Nonetheless, following Birrell and McDonald, (1999, 2000) I explore the value 
of, “conceptualizing particular sporting events or celebrities as “text” and offer 
“readings” of those texts” (2000, p. 3).   
 However, while I am interested in “reading sport critically” (Birrell & 
McDonald, 1999) thereby, “producing...narratives infused with resistant political 
possibilities” (p. 283), I am particularly interested in foregrounding how sporting 
narratives help to inform moral choices.  For while critical textual interpretations of 
sport can and do offer insight into the articulation of multiple and competing power 
vectors in sporting narratives, they often do not take into account that one’s actions 
and moral deliberations may in fact be profoundly influenced by how these stories 
become synthesized into a person’s larger narrative-of-self.  The sort of textual 
interpretation that Birrell and McDonald do suggest, however, has been important in 
the way in which I have formulated my notion of reading particular sporting events 
and reflecting on the moral messages that they may contain.  I call this type of 
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narrative sport as reflexive narrative and will explore the moral work that reading 
these kinds of texts can do in Chapter 5. 
 I am interested, as well, in investigating how, and in what ways, sport figure 
into who we (and others) see ourselves as, on the one hand, and how we come to 
incorporate these sport stories-of-self into our moral deliberations.  The larger 
question, then, has to do importantly, with identity formation, autobiography, and 
moral questions.  The position that I will argue for below, has been informed in a 
significant way by the emerging trends in sociology and anthropology as well as 
critical sport studies.  Increasingly, scholars form each of these disciplines have 
advocated for the value of exploring stories of self, for a variety of meanings.  
Bochner (2001) for example, extols the virtues of narrative research and suggests that, 
among other things, narratives of self can become quite empowering for the narrator.  
Frank (1995) also argues for the efficacy of autobiographical accounts of the self in 
advocating for illness narratives that help to reframe the patient (both privately and 
publicly) as active, engaged, and empowered in care decisions from the more 
traditional orientation of victim of disease (p. xi).  Lance Armstrong’s autobiography, 
which I will elaborate on in Chapter 4, is a good example of the “power” of utilizing 
autobiography to reframe illness.  One importance difference, as I have been 
suggesting, is that sport figures into that redescription in both subtle and profound 
ways. 
 A special edition of the Sociology of Sport Journal:  Imagining Sociological 
Narratives (2000, volume 17, number1) has been important to, not only my project, 
but as an important marker of the narrative trends within the field of sport sociology.  
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The work in this special volume, as well as in several important texts that have 
recently been published9, help to illuminate the promise that narrative discourses have 
in the investigation of human meaning and sport and movement study.  In the 
introduction, Denison and Rinehart (2000) outline the changing landscape in sport 
sociology and the ways in which a continued reevaluation of the importance and 
usefulness of narratives and narrative research will result in expanding our knowledge 
about the world of sport and physical activity.  They claim that: 
The shift into personal experience narratives, storied accounts, or 
ethnographic fiction requires a highly complex and complicated conceptual 
shift in the way one approaches subjects and topics.  It requires a shift in 
sensibilities-perhaps even world view-that we believe should affect every 
decision the researcher makes about the study all the way from the germ of an 
idea to the field to the text.  (Denison & Reinhart, 2000, p. 3)  
I suggest that while the narrative reframing of sport studies research paradigms may, 
in fact, be quite a daunting task as Denison and Reinhart have rightly suggested, that 
people do make sense out of themselves and their actions in their social worlds in and 
through stories is, I contend, quite common. Perhaps (owing to the stranglehold of 
positivistic methods of inquire) the new turn toward narrative is just a reflection of 
this notion…that we have suspected all along.     
 
 
 
 
 
9 See especially, Sparkes (2002) Telling tales in sport and physical activity, and Denison, J. & 
Markula, P. (Eds.)  (2003).  Moving writing:  Crafting movement in sport research for a 
comprehensive overview of the trends in narrative discourse in the academic space of sport studies.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
MORAL FEATURES OF SPORTING NARRATIVES 
 
 
 Having argued that 1) narratives figure into the moral life and thus constitute a 
legitimate form of ethical inquiry, and 2) that sport is particularly well suited to the 
narrative genre, I turn my attention to the moral work that sporting narratives do.  In 
addition, I answer the claims of certain “elitists” who may well argue that while 
sporting narrative can do some moral work they are not complex or nuanced enough 
to do the same kind of moral work as “sophisticated literature” including the works of 
James, Proust, and Beckett , for example.  However, before explicating the way in 
which sporting narratives can work in moral ways, I would like to say a little about 
the nexus of this project. 
 
A Cultural Studies Informed Narrative Ethics 
  It is important to mention that my version of sporting narrative ethics is not 
intended to be a strict adaptation of either the various forms of narrative ethics I have 
outlined in Chapter 2 and later in this chapter, or, following Birrell and McDonald 
(1999, 2000), the close reading of sporting “texts” that has been practiced in the 
discipline of critical sport studies.  My intent, rather, is to appropriate significant 
elements of each “method” and deploy them in a way that, perhaps, allows for a more 
nuanced understanding of morality, sport, and textuality that lies at the frontier of 
these seemingly divergent disciplinary perspectives.  With this interdisciplinary 
perspective in mind, I recognize that these are potentially tumultuous and uneasy 
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academic alliances, yet I believe the value of such an exploration helps to shed a little 
light on the question at hand.  Moreover, cultural studies, as a discipline that has 
historically excavated and explored popular cultural phenomena, provides a valuable 
example of how a community of scholars can argue for (and validate) a more 
collaborative, innovative, and hybridized theoretical perspective in the pursuit of 
academic projects (Wright, 1996, 2004).  Indeed, the intervention of narrative ethics 
within moral philosophy (and bioethics particularly) and the subsequent inclusion of 
sporting stories within narrative ethics similarly represent an innovative and 
important hybrid discourse, as well as a valuable device in the exploration of moral 
actions and meaning.  While I am not suggesting that narrative ethics itself represent 
a fusion of philosophy and cultural studies, I would argue that my inclusion of 
sporting stories within the domain of narrative ethics has been significantly 
influenced by cultural studies. 
  By moving away from the complex and technical language of moral 
philosophy, narrative ethics has the potential to democratize ethical discourse.  That is 
not to say that moral questions are approached in a less sophisticated way, but rather 
through a less sophisticated medium and thus are potentially considered in an 
altogether different light.  Many narrative ethicists including Martha Nussbaum 
(1990), Richard Rorty (1989) and Michael DePaul (1993) for example, argue that 
attentive reading of refined literature10 helps one to expand their moral horizons.  
While this view can be seen as an alternative to the 'propositional' model of moral 
philosophy, I would argue that the moral world is not necessarily any more accessible 
 
10 Reading "refined" literature is not the only type of narrative method advocated by these scholars, but 
it does figure importantly in to a significant number of narrative approaches.  
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by reading Henry James, for example, then pouring over the works of John Stuart 
Mill, or certainly the work of Immanuel Kant!  Sporting narratives, I argue, on the 
other hand, represent profound cultural accessibility, yet also instantiate stories of 
sufficient enough depth to do moral work.   
Sport11, from the perspective of the spectator, participant, or critic has become 
ubiquitous in American culture.  Educators, board members, and activists use sporting 
metaphors to bolster their positions.  In fact, in the recent 2004 presidential race, both 
candidates appeared in interviews the eve of the election on the television sports 
programming leader, ESPN, exploring any number of sport related questions.  A 
quick glance at the local newspaper or television news broadcast reveals that a 
significant portion of each of these media outlets is dedicated to sports coverage 
(Coakley, 2001, p.9).  Sport, for better or worse, represents a significant and lasting 
cultural form.  Given the emphasis of sports in our cultural, however, there remains a 
limited academic exploration of the intricacies of this form of popular culture.  
Moreover, as I stated in the introduction, even less attention has been paid to the 
intersection between sport and morality.   
Sociology, anthropology, psychology, education and philosophy have sub-
fields devoted to the study of sport, however, though, these areas of work has 
remained relatively obscure and peripheral. Cultural studies on the other hand, as a 
hybrid academic discipline whose devotés are profoundly interested in both popular 
to forge these new theoretical and political alliances.  The inter/anti-disiplinarity that 
forms of culture as well as issues of social justice, provides a fertile academic space is 
 
11 Here I am advocating a broad definition of the word "sport" to include organized and unorganized 
physical activity, elite-level athletes, and "arm-chair quarterbacks".  
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sustained by a cultural studies discourse is the sort of alliance I have in mind when 
bringing together narrative ethics and sport.  In arguing for integrating sporting 
narratives into the realm of ethics, I am drawing from a cultural studies perspective to 
make a three-fold claim:  1) That sport as a popular cultural phenomena ought to be 
taken up seriously in the academy, 2) the narratives that some people tell about 
themselves, others, and the world they live in are profoundly impacted by and 
through sport and, 3) that sporting activities, recast and interpolated in narrative form 
influence and impact people’s moral decisions. 
Before I explore the ways in which sport stories can be used for moral 
purposes explicitly, it is useful to clarify what I mean by sport stories in the first 
place.  By sport stories, I am talking about two separate yet related concepts.  First, I 
am claiming that sport and athletic activities can be seen as an important part of the 
story that people tell about themselves, I’ll call this notion sport as autobiography.  
Second, is the idea that particular sporting events, for viewers and participants alike, 
can be understood as stories that can be read and have moral relevance, I’ll call this 
notion sport as reflexive text.  I expand on each of these concepts in chapters 4 and 5 
respectively, but it is important to clarify this distinction ahead of that discussion. 
 
Moral Sporting Narratives:  Like and Unlike Narrative Ethics 
In saying that sporting narratives can do moral work, I am acknowledging the 
important contributions of the narrative ethics positions outlined in Chapter 2.  
Nonetheless, it is important to articulate what kind of moral work sporting narratives 
can do.  Following Nelson (2001), narrativists have claimed: 
 54
That stories of one kind or another are required: (1) to teach us our 
duties, (2) to guide morally good action, (3) to motivate morally good 
action, (4) to justify action on moral grounds, (5) to cultivate our moral 
sensibilities, (6) to enhance our moral perception, (7) to make actions 
or persons morally intelligible, and (8) to reinvent ourselves as better 
persons. (Nelson 2001, p. 36)    
I, too, am interested in the moral efficacy of sporting stories and in particular I 
focus on how such stories can guide morally good actions, motivate morally 
good action, enhance moral perception, and help to reframe (vis-à-vis the 
narrative counterstory) the perspectives of those who hold back potential 
others from fulfilling their full moral agency. 
I’ll start my exploration of the utility of deploying sporting narratives by  
examining the positions of narrative ethicists’ like Martha Nussbaum, Richard Rorty, 
and Michael DePaul who have each in turn,  argued for the value of reading certain 
literary works in order to enhance moral perception among other things.  I’ll highlight 
the salient features of each of these positions and show how they can both be adopted 
to sporting narratives and how sporting narratives can expand on and address the 
particular flaws of these respective positions. 
Nussbaum:  philosophy and literature. 
I begin with Nussbaum for two reasons. First, in suggesting that a careful 
reading of certain literary texts can heighten moral awareness, Nussbaum is one of the 
foremost proponents of an influential, if not elitist, brand of narrative ethics.  Second, 
I consider Nussbaum’s literary approach in order to contrast it with a less highbrow 
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narrative approach, one that draws moral inspiration from sport and other popular 
cultural forms.   
 Nussbaum (1990) claims that the novel works in a moral way because it 
“places us in a position that is both like and unlike the positions that we occupy in 
life” (p. 48): Like positions in life, she insists, because we become emotionally 
involved with the characters in the novel.  Unlike positions in life, in that we are free 
from the “distortions that frequently impede our real-life deliberations” (p. 48).  In 
other words, a well crafted novel allows the reader to become emotionally immersed 
in the story without being detracted by the hustle and bustle of daily life.  The 
singular focus on the nuances of the story, through the act of reading, is what draws in 
and holds our attention.  Likewise, a carefully written novel can nudge our rapt 
attention to issues of moral import but, perhaps, only if those moral issues were 
embedded in the story by the author in the first place.  In the case of Henry James, for 
example, Nussbaum (1990) makes it clear that James’ intent, as expressed in his 
lengthy prefaces, is precisely to highlight certain moral issues experienced by the 
characters.  While this literary method certainly has its advantages, namely carefully 
focusing the attention of the reader to issues of moral significance,  I believe that 
sporting narratives can work in a similar, though less contrived (and thus, perhaps, in 
a more accessible) way. 
 I am arguing that sport narratives (both autobiographical and reflexive) have a 
compelling element that makes them unlike works of fiction.  That element, as 
articulated by Wiland (2003) in his discussion of the value of autobiography for 
moral inquiry, has to do with the fact that the experiences of the narrative actually 
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occurred, whereas in fictive representations, the events (while highly suggestive 
often) are fabricated to a greater or lesser degree.  As Wiland (2003) claims: 
 Narratives in general impart, directly and indirectly, moral lessons to the 
 reader, lessons that the careful and sensitive reader will often appropriate.  But 
 autobiographies also have the peculiar feature of explicitly recounting the 
 author’s own experiences.  So the reader of the autobiography in not only 
 inclined to accept these moral lessons upon reading the work.  She, unlike the 
 reader of fiction, also discovers that someone who has undergone those 
 experiences has come to hold these moral lessons.  Thus the reader of 
 autobiography can consider whether someone who has undergone the 
 experiences the author’s writing recounts is likely to have acquired a more 
 accurate sense of the relative importance of the benefits and harms the 
 narrative deals with. (p. 195)   
 How can viewing certain sporting events (one kind of sport narrative that I 
advocate for) attune one’s moral perceptions, or at least highlight issues of moral 
importance?  As spectators, we often become emotionally involved with the 
characters (or players).  We can empathize with their decisions and actions because 
we have felt similar human emotions ourselves.  Similarly, we can step back from the 
actions performed on the playing fields and in the arenas and assess their moral 
import.  In fact, it is the detachment of sport from the everyday that gives us the 
(unusual) opportunity to survey what is taking place before us in much the same way 
that literary works do.  So, following Nussbaum then, I am claiming that sporting 
narratives can help to illuminate issues of moral significance.  That is to say, sporting 
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narratives can acutely focus the attention of the “reader” in such a way as to highlight 
the subtle moral questions bound up in the narrative itself, thereby helping the reader 
to become “finely aware and richly responsible” (p. 148).   
Sport can be viewed in explicitly narrative terms at both the personal as well 
as the public level.  The relative uniformity of time and space provide a backdrop 
against which sporting events unfold.  Contrary to the mundane actions of everyday 
life, which seldom result in categorical resolution, sporting events usually end with an 
obvious finale.12  Further, sporting events are often culturally situated in a way that 
highlights more of the historical and social contexts as a result, perhaps, of the laser-
like scrutiny that the events tend to get from the medial and popular press.  The 
example of Billie Jean King which I will fully articulate in Chapter 5, hints at this 
notion of historicity.  The structure of sporting events seems to echo that of a literary 
drama, replete with the subplots of tragedy and comedy, hero and villain.  In many 
sporting events (and this is of course facilitated by the commentator), the ‘story’ 
unfolds before our very eyes.  Often the stories take on familiar tropes of the cultures 
in which they are acted out, thus buttressing the master narratives that can be found 
lying about (Nelson, 1997, 2001) in our contemporary culture.  Indeed, as Denzin 
(2001) suggests, “[N]arratives of the self, as temporal constructions, are anchored in 
local institutional cultures and their interpretive practices” (p. 59).  In this sense, the 
unique characteristics of sporting activities, especially time and space, allow the 
participant and the spectator to focus intently on the event from start to finish, thus 
 
12 That is not to say that one’s lived experiences are less story-like than a sporting event per se’ but 
rather, that as a result of the ‘compression of time’, (that is, the temporality of  the event) that these 
events perhaps are more easily ‘read’ than the totality of one’s life-story.  On the other hand, as I 
suggest in chapter 4, sporting autobiographies are certainly ‘readable’ for moral purposes.     
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allowing for the prospect of ‘reading’ any number of possible outcomes into the 
event.  In many ways, the fact that the totality of the event or activity can be reflected 
on at once gives credence to the notion that sport can and does operate as a literary 
narrative does.  Moreover, as Nelson demonstrates (1997, 2001) these stories, while 
certainly embedded within the larger cultural plots, can also serve to challenge those 
(larger cultural plots) assumptive perspectives, and thereby help to reframe in an 
important sense, the discourse on morality in the first place.  
So, following the trend in narrative discourse in general, and in critical sport 
studies in particular, I want to suggest that sporting events can, in fact, be ‘read’ in 
the same way that Nussbaum has argued sophisticated fiction can be read, that is, in 
order to refine the moral perceptions of the reader.  In Chapter 5, I will highlight two 
case studies to further illustrate just how this reading works. 
Rorty and moral perception. 
  Richard Rorty is similarly interested in the role that narratives can play in the 
life of the reader.  In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), Rorty focuses his 
attention on two initiatives: reducing the cruelty in our society and institutions, and 
creating oneself on one’s own terms rather than accept on other’s terms (Nelson, 
2001).  While Rorty acknowledges the validity of each of these endeavors, he holds 
that the two are wholly incommensurable; it is not possible, he claims, to ‘hold the 
two in a single vision’ (Rorty, 1993, p. 147).  Moreover, he contends, “The 
vocabulary of self-creation is necessarily private, unshared, unsuited to argument.  
The vocabulary of justice is necessarily public and shared, a medium for 
argumentative exchange” (Rorty 1989, p. xiv). 
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 Rorty’s insistence that the public and private spheres are incommensurable 
does not diminish his utilization of literature in each project, albeit for different 
purposes. Rorty’s view is predicated on the idea that all that we know about a person 
or persons is based on the contingent history of that person’s life, rather than some 
true facts about the nature of human beings.  In other words, not only does Rorty 
reject the idea that there are universal metaphysical truths out there; he rejects the 
idea that persons in here are best explained by some appeal to the facts of human 
nature.  This view lends itself to the autobiographical self narratives that I explore in 
Chapter 4.    
 This position has important ramifications for Rorty’s dual tasks of self-
creation and the abjuration of public cruelty (and subsequently how Rorty sees stories 
fitting into this project).  In the first instance, that of self-creation, Rorty claims that 
we should be “ironists”.  Ironists according to Rorty, “substitute a tissue of contingent 
relations, a web which stretches backward and forward through past and future time, 
for a formal, unified, present, self-containing substance, something capable of being 
seen steadily and whole” (1989, p. 41).  Since there is no overarching intrinsic nature, 
it is incumbent on each individual to be in charge of the descriptions of themselves 
paying close attention to their individual history as well as to the idea that each 
redescription of oneself cannot ever ‘get it right’.  These ironic self-redescriptions 
involve looking for what Rorty calls one’s final vocabulary.  The problem is that prior 
descriptions (final vocabularies) of a person might tether someone to the wrong 
language-game and therefore turn him or her into the wrong kind of human being – 
the kind of human being for whom the abjuration of cruelty is not the most important 
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thing, presumably, though he is at pains to adequately explain why that must be the 
case (Rorty, 1989).  At any rate, the irony rests with the idea that, while a person 
continually seeks to find his or her final vocabulary, that person is also aware of  a 
contingent history which implies that no final vocabulary can ever really be final, in 
the sense that Rorty speaks of, since all descriptions are socially constructed in the 
first place. 
 It is here that Rorty advocates paying close attention to particular literary 
works.  Rorty maintains that these works of fiction can help by playing vocabularies 
off one another.  Nelson (2001) provides a clear account of what Rorty has in mind: 
By redescribing their pasts and their present situation in terms of the new final 
vocabularies that literary critics have created, and then comparing the results 
with alternative redescriptions that use final vocabularies of alternative critics, 
Rorty claims, ironists hope to make the best selves for themselves that they 
possibly can (Rorty 1989, p. 80).  The ironist who, to take one of Rorty’s 
examples, reads Remembrance of Things Past can look to Proust/Marcel as a 
moral advisor who will help her to do what he did-to free himself from other 
people’s descriptions of him (pp. 80-81).  Or she can try on Nietzsche’s final 
vocabulary, or that of any other literary critic who gives her a language that is 
better than the one she is using.  (Nelson 2001, p. 49)   
Moreover, Nelson (2001) concludes that the, “project of self-invention thus revolves 
around two narrative acts.  The first is to read sophisticated literature, and the second 
is to use that literature as a guide to retelling one’s own story” (p. 49 ). 
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 Rorty also proposes the use of novels for the second of his projects, that of 
eliminating cruelty.  However, while the ironist uses the works of literary critics to 
aid in the redescription in oneself, the liberal (as Rorty refers to those who view 
cruelty as the worst thing that one can do) turn to stories that help us see how our 
public social practices can make us cruel.  Books, in Rorty’s conception, whether for 
public or private use, should aim at a new final vocabulary.  These books, Rorty 
insists, while relatively few in numbers are the ones that make the biggest difference 
in the long run (Rorty 1989, p. 143). 
 In the end, it is clear that, for Rorty, books play an important role in the lives 
of the individual and society at large.  Individuals intent on self-creation are well 
served by particular works that help them to learn new vocabularies that, “permit the 
exercise of personal excellence” (Nelson 2001,  p. 48) and thereby help people to 
describe themselves in their own terms.  Like Nussbaum, Rorty advocates reading 
certain narrative works that help to broadly refine one’s moral perceptions, thus 
allowing one to describe oneself in their own final vocabulary.   
 In many ways, the personal redescription that Rorty speaks of can be found 
both in the private and public spheres and in autobiographical and reflexive sporting 
narratives correspondingly.  Sporting narratives can also be read in a way that helps 
to introduce new vocabularies in both the public sphere, thus leading to vigorous civic 
debate, and again in the private sphere, leading to the reexamination of one’s ‘final 
vocabulary.’  Sport as reflexive text seems to work in both of these instances, in my 
view, in the way that Rorty explains.  Often, for example, a particular sporting event 
will capture the public attention in such a way that upon deeper examination, our 
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public perceptions are challenged (at least) and perhaps altered in some fundamental 
way.  As I explain in chapter 5, the story of Algerian distance runner, Hassiba 
Bulmerka, provides a good example of how viewing a sport performance as a 
narrative text can yield a public debate on the issue of gender equality for example.  
Reading and reframing the meaning of the championship performances of Bulmerka, 
as Rorty has suggested one can do with literature, may help a society to recognize and 
establish a dialogue about public practices that are seemingly cruel.  This same 
example, however can also work to reframe the private aim of self-creation that Rorty 
suggests by allowing an individual to view seemingly incommensurable positions (the 
fundamentalist Muslim code of purdah for example) with Algerian nationalistic pride 
engendered by Bulmerka’s many victories.  Once viewed in this way, a person is 
perhaps able to integrate this heretofore untenable personal position (that Muslim 
women should not compete in athletic contests for example) with a reconciled and 
thus importantly redescribed final vocabulary – to use Rorty’s term.  While there has 
been considerable debate in the sport philosophy literature (see Roberts, 1998 and 
Morgan, 2000a) as to the relative value placed on Rorty’s public/private distinction, 
what remains consistent and for my purposes extremely meaningful, is the value that 
stories have in helping to wrangle with moral and ethical dilemmas no matter how      
(historically and contextually) contingent.   
DePaul: balance and refinement. 
 In his book Balance and Refinement (1993) DePaul offers an alternative to 
more traditional coherentist views of moral beliefs.  In summing up DePaul’s project, 
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and laying out the coherentist view that DePaul is arguing to modify, Tappolet (1998) 
remarks:   
  These days, most of those who are optimistic about moral knowledge and 
 moral justification or warrant are coherentists. More precisely, they follow 
 John Rawls in claiming that the appropriate method for arriving at moral 
 beliefs is that which aims at wide reflective equilibrium -- a state in which 
 particular and general moral beliefs plus other sorts of beliefs such as 
 philosophical ones form a coherent whole -- by eliminating conflict in favour 
 of the beliefs which are more strongly held. In a nutshell, DePaul's thesis is 
 that such a picture is guilty of overlooking the importance of moral 
 experiences, a shortcoming the method he proposes, that is the method of 
 balance and refinement, seeks to correct. (1998, p.473)  
 While DePaul himself is sympathetic to a Rawlsian reflective equilibrium 
methodology, he nonetheless contends that:  
The version of coherentism I propose deviates from the intellectualist 
conception in both recognizing the significant role of life experiences and 
experiences with literature, theater, and film in moral inquiry and allowing for 
revisions of moral beliefs that are not required either to cohere with other 
standing moral, philosophical or empirical beliefs or by the acquisition of new 
empirical information. (DePaul 1993, p. 10) 
He goes on to explain that his method, that of balance and refinement, (as opposed to 
ether foundationalist or intellectual coherentist methodologies) is significantly 
different even though it may seem to offer a “minor variant” of the coherent method 
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of moral inquest.  “While there is an obvious place for argument, explanation, and 
theory construction”, DePaul argues, “there is also a prominent place for literature, 
music, and art and for philosophical reflections on these” (1993, p. 10). 
 What role does literature have in moral inquiry according to DePaul?  
Drawing on Nussbaum, DePaul similarly supposes that reading the right kinds of 
novels can help to better develop a person’s faculty of moral judgment.  In DePaul’s 
view, one “significant function of literature it to supply the kind of experience that is 
needed to develop a person’s faculty of moral judgment” (1993, p. 205).  DePaul 
asserts that people need training and guidance to make more informed moral 
discriminations.  Certain books (as well as plays and works of art) offer important 
avenues for people to hone their moral perceptions.  For DePaul, particular novels 
have advantageous characteristics that make them extremely well suited to the 
purpose of moral refinement.  First, they highlight complex situations that require 
intense moral judgment, situations that may not occur very often in a person’s life.  
Second, novels can allow for a kind of emotional distance that a person often cannot 
escape when they do find themselves in a complicated moral situation that require 
complicated moral judgments.  In this way, says DePaul, one can sufficiently, 
“minimize the effects of personal bias and clouding of judgment” (1993, p. 205).  
Thirdly, situations described in novels, while often more intricate than those 
described in philosophical literature, are not as elaborate as real moral situations and 
thus are more readily grasped. What's more, the author of the story has already lead 
the reader to pay attention to particular matters through the use of certain literary 
devices such as plot, character development, and other “framing devices”(1993, p. 
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205-206).  As a result of the author’s guidance and partial interpretation of the 
scenario, “a novel…provides an example that might help a person to see how to sort 
out the salient features of a real-life situation…” (p. 205).   
 I am partial to DePaul’s adaptation of a narrative approach to ethics at least in 
the sense that he is more willing to allow for the incorporation of non-literary forms 
of narratives that can read for the purpose of enhancing moral perception and refining 
moral discrimination.  While he does not state it explicitly, he may be willing to 
concede that certain sporting narratives can, in fact, focus our attention to important 
moral issues and therefore influence one’s moral judgment. On the other hand, after 
reading the work of each of these theorists, what seems apparent is, for each, the best 
path for the enhancement of moral perception rests within the reading of particularly 
sophisticated literature.  Even DePaul, who is seemingly more open to the possibility 
of allowing for certain non-literature texts to be evaluated for moral purposes, seems 
to eschew more popular form of culture for the same purpose. These versions of a 
narrative approach to ethics, in my view, have some important limitations that non-
literary narrative approachs help to overcome. 
          
Difficulties with Narrative Approaches 
 For DePaul, Nussbaum and Rorty, the idea of appealing to the careful reading 
of certain texts plays a central role in their methodological approach to the 
examination of moral questions.  However, while the notion of refining moral 
perception (and the subsequent fine-tuning of one actions) in this decidedly ordinary 
way may move away from the abstract approaches advanced by many moral theorists, 
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the narrative approaches to ethics furnished by Nussbaum, Rorty, and DePaul are not 
without problems.  In Love’s Knowledge, as I have outlined above, Nussbaum (1990) 
argues that a person can develop moral perception through the careful reading of 
particular literary works.  She claims that by reading “alert winged” novels, a person 
can make oneself the kind of person “on whom nothing is lost” (Nussbaum 1990, p. 
149).  In short, Nussbaum argues for the value and usefulness of reading the works of 
James, Proust, Dickens and the like.  As Nelson points out, one problem with 
Nussbaum’s approach “…has to do with the social privilege that must be enjoyed by 
any narrative agent using Nussbaum’s approach” (Nelson 2001, p. 50).  In short, 
Nussbaum’s approach is elitist in that it takes a particular kind of privilege (both 
social and moral) to access the subtle moral refinements suggested by certain works 
of fiction.  My argument mirrors that of educationists and others who have 
convincingly argued against the literary (or philosophical for that matter) cannon in 
general education courses on university campuses, for example.  For Nussbaum, as 
for Rorty (and to a significant extent DePaul), the proposition that one should read 
sophisticated literature assumes that one would choose to immerse themselves in 
these literary works if they had cultural access to them.  Furthermore, for a great 
number of people, “the material conditions, institutions, training, and experiences that 
would allow serious fiction to enter their lives are simply not available” (Nelson 
2001, p. 50).  Moreover, why are these works of fiction the only narrative works that 
have been suggested?  Is it because other kinds of narratives lack the ability to direct 
one’s attention in an appropriately moral way?  As I have been arguing thus far, I 
don’t believe so.  
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  Rorty and DePaul also advocate reading particular novels that are arguably 
elitist.  As with the work of Nussbaum, an important question remains; who gets to 
pick the kinds of novels that can be useful in the process of either moral refinement or 
ironic self-creation?  On both accounts, the books that these theorists highlight are 
particularly “sophisticated” by most standards.  The selections that Nussbaum, Rorty 
and DePaul have in mind seem to be picked from a ‘classic liberal arts cannon’ and as 
such, seem to benefit those with significant social privilege.  The charge of elitism in 
the methodologies described above can have significant consequences on the status of 
persons as full moral agents.  While Nussbaum, Rorty, and DePaul all proclaim to 
advance moral and social theories that seek to ameliorate social injustice, it seems 
ironic that their methods do not appear to be welcoming to all but the well-bred and 
well-read intellectual.  Moreover, if narrative ethics represents an important 
intervention in the more traditional (and arguably more complex) propositional ethics 
approaches and one of those advances is that the new narrative approach tends to be 
more comprehensible than traditional philosophical approaches, then there seems to 
be a serious paradox in suggesting Proust and James, whose work is difficult to 
understand in the most educated circles.           
What are we to make of persons who do not attend to the kinds of 
sophisticated literature that is championed by Nussbaum and the like (with or with 
out social privilege)?  Are they granted partial status as moral agents on these views?  
Is their potentiality for moral refinement in some way stunted or corrupted?  Of 
course I do not want to argue that people who possess significantly less ‘cultural 
capital’ could not and do not have the intellectual ability to apprehend the complex 
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moral nuance of ‘alert winged novels’; rather, I want to ask: why should these types 
of novels be insisted upon in the first place?  One could, in this sense, argue for the 
moral efficacy of attaining a particular ‘classics’ based education, rather than 
gleaning any useful moral lessons from particular literary works.  This elitist position 
is troubling at best.  
 I argue, contrary to Nussbaum, Rorty and others, that the path to moral 
refinement need not be accessible primarily (or secondarily) through the reading and 
understanding of ‘great works of fiction’ (Nussbaum 1990, p. 148).  Rather, I would 
suggest that an individual can and does make use of many different kinds of moral 
conduits, or pathways that can help her achieve a heightened sense of moral 
awareness (I will expand the idea of the moral conduit below).  Further, in chapter 5, 
I introduce the concept of moral mobility that expands on the notion of the moral 
conduit by recognizing, not only that people utilize a variety of moral pathways, but  
that those who do deliberate moral issues in non-traditional (philosophical) ways need 
not be excluded from the realm of moral agency.13   
 In the next two chapters, I argue that sporting narratives, when included in the 
realm of perception-refining stories can figure importantly into the moral life.  
Moreover, I will present two case studies for each type of sporting narrative I am 
suggesting in order to better demonstrate how the approach I advocate takes the 
salient features of the (above mentioned) narrative approaches and expands upon their 
 
13 By saying that persons have not been included in the realm of moral agency, I am not suggesting that 
moral philosophers don’t acknowledge their existence of course, but simply that by predicating a 
system on the reading of certain sophisticated literature on the one hand, or having a comprehensive 
understanding of propositional moral systems on the other, that the unintended consequence seems to 
leave many folks outside of the sphere of consideration by moral philosophers;  a prospect I find 
troubling.  
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obvious shortcomings.  However, before moving on to these discussions, I would like 
to revisit Nelson’s (2001) notion of the narrative counterstory as I think utilizing a 
version of this approach, as related to the two types of sport narratives I have been 
arguing for, can help to circumvent several of the shortcomings of the aforementioned 
narrative approaches.  
  
Nelson:  The Counterstory as Alternative Narrative Representation 
 In arguing for the usefulness of narrative counterstories, Nelson (2001) has 
claimed that, persons have the possibility of repairing identities damaged by the 
prevailing, and often marginalizing, stories of our culture.  Simply put, the narrative 
counterstory is a story that is told, in contrast to a master narrative, by one who is 
experiencing oppression. The point in telling the counterstory, then, is to repair the 
damage that has been done to a person by the oppressive message that the master 
narrative sends. Furthermore, according to Nelson, successful counterstories help the 
agent to alter her oppressors’ perceptions of her (2001).  
 A second and equally important outcome of the successful counterstory is that 
it can help the oppressed agent alter her perception of herself.  In the sense that 
oppression can infiltrate the oppressed person’s conciseness, she or he can 
unwittingly become complicitous in her or his own oppression.  According to Nelson 
(2001): 
By helping a person with an infiltrated consciousness to change her self-
understanding, counterstories permit the agent to put greater trust in her own 
moral worth.  If the counterstory moves her to see herself as a competent 
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moral agent, she will be less willing to accept others’ oppressive valuations of 
her, and this too allows her to exercise her agency more freely. (p. 7-8) 
 In short, the successful narrative counterstory can fulfill two aims: that of 
recognition by one’s oppressor and that of allowing the oppressed agent to 
overcome their infiltrated consciousness and recognize themselves in the full 
capacity of their agency. 
 Moreover, deploying counterstories offer a lowbrow alternative to the 
narrative ethics perspective suggested by Nussbaum (1999) and the like, in that the 
telling of a counterstory need not be dependant on the literary acumen of the narrator, 
but rather on the success or failure of their story to dislodge the more oppressive 
meanings that are bound up in the master narrative. The counterstory is keyed to the 
larger cultural master narratives, as they relate to illness or gender as I’ll suggest 
below, yet seek to articulate those stores in fundamentally redescriptive ways.   
 So what is a master narrative and how can telling counterstories help to undo 
the possible oppressive messages that they engender?  According to Nelson (2001) 
master narratives are, “the stories found lying about in our culture” (p. 6) that serve as 
summaries of socially shared understandings.  Nelson goes on to explain that: 
 Master narratives are often archetypal, consisting of stock plots and readily 
 recognizable character types, and we use them not only to make sense of our 
 experiences (Nisbett and Ross 1980) but also to justify what we do (MacIntyre 
 1984).  As the repositories of common norms, master narratives exercise a 
 certain authority over our moral imaginations and play a role in informing our 
 moral intuitions. (p. 6) 
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While not exclusively oppressive, master narratives often figure prominently in the 
ways in which people in groups with relatively less social empowerment have been 
considered by those with greater degrees of agency.  As Nelson (2001) notes, relating 
how identity is constructed, in part, by narrative; “I claimed that the stock plots and 
readily recognizable character types of master narratives characterize groups of 
peoples in certain ways, thereby cultivating and maintaining norms for the behavior 
of the people who belong to these groups, and weighting the ways others will or 
won’t tend to see them” (p. 106).  In other words, if, for example, the stories about 
women’s participation in sport are ones that have been historically subordinated to the 
archetypal cultural stories (master narratives) about men’s heroic sporting triumphs, 
they can serve to perpetuate men’s understanding of their ‘ownership’ of sport on the 
one hand, and to justify the overt and covert practices that have helped to thwart 
women’s attempts at equity in the world of sport on the other.  Of equal importance is 
the message that is sent by these master narratives to women about sport 
participation. While not, of course, forbidden, the acceptability of participation in 
sport by women (and particular sports especially) is often less enthusiastic 
encouraged, and often downright banned.  Therefore, it is possible to conceive of the 
scenario where girls and young women simply do not have an interest in sport 
participation (despite its many documented benefits) since there are, and certainly 
were, relatively few master narratives that forgrounded that acceptable reality.  So, 
how does one combat the potentially agency diminishing messages communicated 
through many of these oppressive master narratives?  This is where Nelson’s (1995, 
2001) idea of the narrative counterstory comes in.   
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 “The counterstory” says Nelson (2001), “positions itself against a number of 
master narratives...” (p. 6).  Counterstories work in two steps.  The first step, “is to 
identify the fragments of master narratives that have gone into the construction of and 
oppressive identity, noting how these fragments misrepresent persons…and 
situations” (p. 7).  The second step is to: 
  Retell the story about the person or the group to which the person belongs in 
 such a way as to make visible the morally relevant details that the master 
 narratives suppressed.  If the retelling is successful, the group members will 
 stand reveled as respectworthy agents.  (Nelson 2001, p. 7) 
By telling an effective counterstory, one that resists the oppressive master narratives, 
the person is able to resist the “evil of diminished moral agency” (Nelson 2001, p. 7).  
Furthermore, if the dominant group is sufficiently persuaded by the counterstory and 
sees the oppressed group as full moral agents, they may be less likely to “deprive 
them of the opportunities to enjoy valuable roles, relationships, and goods” (p. 7).  
 Besides the aim of telling counterstories in order to reclaim one’s 
subordinated moral status against oppressive master narratives, a secondary aim of 
the counterstory, argues Nelson (2001) is to “alter, where necessary, an oppressed 
person’s perception of herself” (p. 7).  This is important says Nelson, because 
“oppression often infiltrates a person’s consciousness, so that she comes to operate, 
from her own point of view, as here oppressors want here to, rating herself as they 
rate her (p. 7).  So the stakes of telling a convincing counterstory are high because the 
more likely a person is to see themselves as a competent “moral agent” (p. 7) the less 
likely they may be to accept others’ oppressive valuations of her” (p. 7). 
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 In the following case studies, there are many instances where the subplot of 
the story is, in a significant way, just the type of counterstory that I have been talking 
about.  I will argue that, while each type of sporting story presented can be put to 
good use for moral ends as it relates to increasing moral perception or motivating 
morally good actions, they can also be deployed as counterstories thereby helping to 
reframe both oppressive master narratives (and those who benefit from them) as well 
as the infiltrated consciousness’ of moral agents who themselves are oppressed by the 
limiting master narratives.      
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CHAPTER IV 
 
SPORT AS AUTOBIOGRAPHY:  TWO CASE STUDIES 
 
 
In this chapter, I present two case studies in order to demonstrate the moral 
efficacy of sport as autobiography.  It will, of course be incumbent on me to make the 
case that these self-told stories are, in fact morally relevant to each respective author.  
In choosing these stories to utilize, it is evident that both Lance Armstrong and Tosha 
Tsang are world class athletes.  However, one need not be a professional athlete to 
importantly frame his or her identity in and through participation in sport, as my 
personal narrative in the introduction has suggested.  In fact, I would argue that since 
many people do, in part, define themselves in terms of their athletic experiences and 
subsequently draw on those experiences for moral purposes, it only helps to bolster 
the claim that people utilize any number of moral conduits (a concept that I elaborate 
on below) to help motivate and guide morally good actions.  Further, the ubiquity of 
sport and sport participation (presented elsewhere in this project) suggests that the 
level of success one achieves at sport does not necessarily correlate with the 
importance that sport has on framing one’s self-told-narrative, though it seems 
plausible that one who engaged in sport as a career, for instance, may encounter 
issues particular to that social reality that the casual or competitive (but not elite) 
athlete may not.  However, it is important to note, more because of what it says about 
the public and academic consumption of sport than about what it says about potential 
research results, that much of the scholarly work conducted by sport studies 
researchers still seems to focus on the elite athlete. 
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Autobiography, Identity and Sport:  General Contours 
Over the past several decades, sport studies scholars (see Birrell and 
McDonald, 1999, 2000, for example) have chartered important contributions to the 
discourse surrounding questions of identity.  In the wake the postmodern intervention, 
universalistic explanations have often been rendered obsolete. Lather (1991), for 
example, argues that postmodernism and poststructuralism have been instrumental in 
setting “up procedures to continuously demystify the realities we create, to fight the 
tendencies for our categories to congeal” (p. 13).  Consequently, even historically 
taken for granted ideas such as ‘human nature’ have been abandoned or at least 
seriously challenged (Rorty, 1989).  Socio-historical contingency has replaced 
scientific certainty in both subject and method, thereby dislodging scientific reason as 
the primary tool for truth excavation.  Not surprisingly, in this postmodern climate, 
the notion of identity has undergone a significant reconceptualization.  Indeed, much 
of the recent sport studies work on identity is consistent with the post-modern notion 
of  fractured and multiple identities (Fuss, 1995).  The significance of disarticulating 
the enlightenment notion of a 'core self' can not be underestimated.  Challenging the 
prevailing theoretical and research paradigms, with their emphasis on quantification, 
resulted in, among other things, crucial interventions from diverse (and consistently 
marginalized) groups of scholars, including but not limited to, feminist, anti-racist, 
gay, lesbian, and trans-gendered persons.  By opening the door to the recognition of a 
multiplicity of identifications that make up one’s identity, and eschewing the 
tendency to conceptualize identity as monolithic (and essentializable), a critical new 
direction in the social sciences was born.   
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This new moment in qualitative research, as Denzin and Lincoln (1994, 2000) 
have identified it, is often characterized by an increasing uncertainly or perceived 
inability to adequately describe social reality. (Marcus and Fischer, 1986).  In this 
sense, it was not just the subject (those under investigation by researchers) but the 
method of representation of those inquiries that was also at issue.  This moment in 
qualitative research is often regarded as the crisis of representation (Sparkes, 2002).  
As Denzin and Lincoln explain: 
New models of truth, method, and representation were sought….Critical, 
 feminist, and epistemologies of color now competed for attention in this 
 arena.  Issues such as validity, reliability, and objectivity, previously believed 
 settled, were once more problematic.  Pattern and interpretive theories, as 
 opposed to casual, linear theories, were now more common, as writers 
 continued to challenge older models for truth and meaning.  (2000, p. 16)        
As a challenge to the old methods of representation, new perspectives of 
representation in sport studies research began to emerge, including what Denzin and 
Lincoln (2000) refer to as postexperimental writers who, “seek to connect their 
writing to the needs of a free and democratic society” (p.17).  Moreover, as they 
continue hinting at the push toward the exploration of issues of moral significance, 
“the demands of a moral and sacred qualitative social science are actively explored by 
a host of new writers from many different disciplines” (p. 17).   
The push for the exploration of one’s story of self (Sparkes, 2002 and 
Bochner, 2001) has informed an important insights into the motivations and actions 
of people even while recognizing, following Butler (1991), that identity and/or 
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particular identifications are not always positive, but rather contested, negotiated and 
often hegemonic. 
     Moreover, in sport studies research as well, this important reorientation 
toward narrative inquiry has similarly emerged with the rise of post-modernist 
thought.  In general, narrative research has been a powerful tool in examining the 
lives of athletes (Denison, 1996; Denison & Rinehart, 2000; Duncan, 1998; Foley, 
1992; McDonald & Birrell, 1999; Sparks, 1999, 2000, 2002). By looking at the 
stories that athletes tell about themselves, researchers are better able to understand the 
actions, motives, and conflicting identifications that impact an athlete’s lived 
experience.  A central tenant of the wave of new critical sport studies research is the 
assertion that most human meaning is a social construction, thus fluid, changeable 
and non-fixed. While this perspective has been important in better articulating the 
experience of athletes, especially those athletes who have been historically 
marginalized within mainstream culture, the expectations of long-standing yet 
historically contingent social roles remain.  Critical narrative approaches help sport 
studies researchers begin to make sense of the implications of ‘managing’ multiple 
(and contested) identifications against more traditional social expectations.  
Furthermore, narrative research that foregrounds the athlete's perspective, 
interpretation and evaluation of their own experiences, helps to facilitate a 
reconsideration of previously common-sense ideas about, for example, gender, 
technology, masculinity, race, class, ability, sexual orientation, and the body, to name 
but a few. 
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 Despite the penetrating insights gained through narrative research, there 
remains a lack of critical philosophical work that incorporates the discourse on the 
social (and necessarily contingent) construction of identity on the one hand, with 
research on the moral judgments and actions of athletes in general and of socially 
marginalized athletes in particular on the other.  Heretofore, there seems to be a 
limited number of studies that have combined the methodologies of sociology, 
philosophy, and psychology (respectively), in order to capture the complexity and 
richness of the issue of moral deliberation.   
 Of course, there has been ample work in the field of applied sport psychology 
that investigates moral development of athletes or issues of fair play and ethical 
choice making especially as it relates to children and moral development (Stuart, 
2003; Gibbons & Ebbeck, 1995; Bredemeier, 1993).  Fisher and Bredemeier (2000), 
for example, explored the moral orientations of professional female bodybuilders and 
how those orientations impacted moral choices when thinking about moral dilemmas.  
 To be sure, there is a great opportunity to do collaborative and innovative 
research across disciplinary boarders as it relates to questions of moral development 
and moral reasoning and while it seems presumptuous at best to claim that any 
research method could fully enlighten the process of moral deliberation, the 
interdisciplinary and hybridized theory and practice which, as I described in Chapter 
1, is the hallmark of cultural studies, offers some promising new directions for the 
present inquiry.  More specifically, I have argued that the utilization of sporting 
narratives and critical sport autobiography discourses can help to reframe old research 
questions thus ‘making the familiar strange’.  
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 Much of this work is underway in the transdiciplinary space of sport studies 
(Sparkes, 2002; Denison & Rinehart, 2000).  As I have suggested, sport studies 
scholars have taken up the examination (and production) of autobiography (also 
referred to as autoethnography in qualitative research) in order to explore any number 
of issues related to sporting practices.  As Sparkes (2002) articulates, stories of the 
self have been utilized to examine among other things, “issues relating to body-self 
relationships over time, identity construction, gender, sexuality, aging, impairment, 
disability, race, and ethnicity” (p. 79). 
The moral self 
So what counts as a ‘moral self’ in the first place and how do autobiographies 
help one to enrich and expand this self?  Nelson’s (2001) perspective helps to shed 
light on this question and point in the direction that I am suggesting.  Stories, in 
Nelson’s view, can be self-definitional in addition to being nonmoral, morally weak, 
or morally strong (p. 15).  A story of strong moral self definition is one that 
demonstrates a “kind of moral competence” (p. 15).  Drawing from Walker (1987) 
Nelson argues, as do I, against universalistic moral theories that hand down 
prescriptive requirement of persons in certain situations, without regard for the 
particular circumstances.  In contrast, Nelson (2001) suggests that:  
There are identity-constitutive features of a moral agent’s life that can give 
content to the particular ways in which this particular agent may or may not 
act…This agent might have commitments or priorities that differ from another 
agent in a similar situation…In deliberating about what we ought to do, the 
agent reviews her personal history, weighs the particulars of her past in terms 
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of more general moral values, and discerns or constructs a course of action 
that expresses a commitment to those particulars. (p. 16) 
Moreover, says Nelson, a person creates a “moral track record” (p. 16) that seems to 
set him or her on a particular path of moral choice-making.  Reflecting on one’s 
personal history (or autobiography) helps to explain who one is, while thinking about 
future actions and moral commitments, requires a person to look ahead to decide 
where she or he wants to go (Nelson, 2001).  In any case, “strong moral self-
definition…allows certain individuating features of the person’s life to matter in ways 
that aren’t universally generalizable but remain specific to that person and so 
contribute to her identity” (p. 16). 
 This is the sense I have been advocating for, by suggesting that the 
incorporation of sport and sport autobiography into the matrix of events and identity-
constituting actions be included into the history that one contemplates when making 
important or minor moral decisions.  The point that is important, from Nelson, is that 
the weight one gives to how a particular experience will be folded into their future 
moral choice making framework, is predicated on the way that that persons integrate 
that, or any, experience into their larger narrative self.       
Tappan (1999) similarly argues for a more expanded view of what constitutes 
a “moral self” (p. 117).  His view is centered on the perspective that most, 
“theoretical and empirical work on the moral self” (p. 117) has been from an 
explicitly “psychological” perspective.  This perspective, claims Tappan, has centered 
on internal psychological functioning as the main characteristic of what constitutes an 
individual or, more importantly for my purposes, one’s moral “identity” (p. 117).  
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However, Tappan suggests that while important insights about the moral self have 
certainly been gleaned from this psychological perspective, steadfastly focusing on 
the internal cognitive process alone, perhaps, paints only part of the picture of the 
moral self.  Thus, Tappan advocates an approach that can, “appreciate and 
acknowledge the role that social, relational, and discursive processes play in the 
formation of moral identity (p. 118).  Tappan, however, is leery of assigning too 
much weight to either the purely psychological account of the moral self or the purely 
social account of the moral self; rather, he suggests an alternative, dialogical 
perspective that seeks to obviate what he sees as the shortcomings of each position.  
Further, in explicating this dialogical perspective on the moral self, Tappan points 
toward the value of using autobiographies and life histories as an integral part of this 
process.  Writing an autobiography is important, says Tappan (1999), because:  
It enables an author to write and rewrite both his moral life and his moral self, 
 autobiographies necessarily entail a process of self-interpretation that is a 
 critical aspect of identity and self-understanding.  Most important, however, 
 this is not an interpretive process that focuses on inner thoughts and feelings.  
 Rather, it focuses on cultural tools and ideological resources-specifically, 
 words, language, and forms of discourse-that comprise the texts that the 
 author, himself, has fashioned vis-à-vis his life.  (Tappan, 1999, p. 129). 
Tappan goes on to suggest that the autobiography not only helps one to frame 
onesselves as a moral agent through introspection, but within and against the complex 
social tapestry, (to borrow Murray’s (1998) instructive metaphor again) of one’s life.   
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 Autobiographies provide, “the clearest evidence we have” as Tappan says (p. 
129) of the level to which moral selfhood-identity is a mediated action that helps to 
show, to ourselves and others, who we are and what we value.  From a dialogical 
perspective, Tappan (1999) concludes the process of rhetorical action and persuasion 
that we and other autobiographers engage in, “differs in degree, but not in kind, from 
the process of identity formation and transformation we all undertake, as we seek to 
act and interact, in morally meaningful ways, with others with whom we live and 
share our world” (pp. 129-130, emphasis added). 
 Hardwig (1998) rightly points out that one of the main arguments against 
focusing exclusively on autobiography for moral purposes (in bioethics) seems to be 
the likelihood  that an individual will either tell a partial story about themselves, or 
not have enough insight into his or her motivations and actions to accurately relate a 
cogent story of self.  Hardwig, however, offers an important amendment to the notion 
of self told autobiography, which seems to echo Tappan’s (1999) position, by 
suggesting that it is important to, “acknowledge that an autobiography is only one 
account of a life” (p. 61).  Hardwig’s suggestion for the pursuit of a “more complex 
view of narrative” (p. 62) seems to me to be an important contribution.  This 
perspective demands that we ‘fact-check’ our story at least in the sense that we have 
an awareness that we are not (seemingly paradoxically) the only author of our story 
and, as Tappan (1999) has suggested too, the story of ourselves that has the most 
moral efficacy is the one told within, not beyond our web of potential co-authors; 
those whose stories help to inform and shape how we see ourselves. 
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While Hardwig is mostly concerned with medical practitioners listening to the 
larger story of the person’s self-told narrative (rather than the patient’s singular 
perspective), some of the underlying concepts are of help in identifying how I am 
conceiving of utilizing sport autobiography in this project.  In my view, the carefully 
conceived autobiographer (and, given the postmodern shadings of this project, I do 
not believe there is one singular narrative that could accurately capture that 
experience) is a person who, as Hardwig claims, “has long participated in a complex, 
multiperson process, listening to many different accounts of her dreams, fears, plans, 
actions, activities, and past” (p. 62).  
Similarly, I am arguing that people often come to understand themselves in 
and through the sporting stories that they tell about themselves and that  
others (and this is similar to Tappan’s notion of co-authors)  tell about them, thereby 
integrating implicitly or explicitly those experiences and sporting identifications into 
one’s life-story.  If one accepts the contention that significant experiences, including 
sporting experiences, can become important features of how people come to see 
themselves (and perhaps of how others see them as well), and that people often 
conceive of their identity in the narrative form (as I will explain below), it is plausible 
to suggest that, when interpreted in an autobiographical way, one’s sporting 
experiences can shed significant light on moral deliberations(as my autobiography 
and the case studies below will show), and indeed how one construes themselves, 
following Tappan (1999), as a moral self.  First, however, I will sketch out the 
position that people’s identities are significantly constituted in the narrative genre, 
thereby allowing one’s story to be told and read for moral purposes.  In other words, I 
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am advocating that the notion of text be expanded to include the personal (non-
literate) autobiographical self. 
In suggesting that physical activities and sport experiences can be seen as part 
of a person’s self-authored story, I am also building on certain claims of MacIntyre 
(1984), Schechman (1996), Denzin (2000, 2001) and Tappan’s (1999).  In her 1996 
book, The Constitution of Selves, Mayra Schechtman claims that, “a person creates 
his identity by forming an autobiographical narrative-a story of his life” (1996, p. 93).  
Schechtman goes on to explain that her so called view of self-constitution helps to 
explain “our intuitions about the relationship between personal identity and survival, 
moral responsibility, self-interested concern and compensation (1996, p. 93).  
Importantly, for Schechtman, one’s story has to make sense in a particular way.  In 
other words, as Schechtman argues, self-constitution necessarily follows a narrative 
form and, as a result, renders one’s actions comprehensible.  Moreover, Schechtman 
argues a person’s autobiography must be intelligible and that the narrator must be 
able to explain actions and beliefs in terms of explicit and implicit self-narratives.  
What I find compelling in Schechtman’s notion, and what I am emphasizing in this 
dissertation, is the idea that people form important understandings of themselves in 
and through the stories that they tell about themselves and that these understandings 
inform one’s actions morally in important ways.  The ability to reflect on these 
notions of self in moral terms informs one’s sense of moral identity, or, that is, “one’s 
enduring sense of oneself as a moral person”, (p. 117) as Tappen (1999) claims. 
 MacIntyre (1984) also argues that lives are lived and made sense of in a 
narrative form. According to MacIntyre, “it is because we all live out narratives in our 
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lives and because we understand our own lives in terms of narratives that we live out 
that the form of narrative is appropriate for understanding the actions of others” 
(1984, p. 212).  Furthermore, as MacIntyre goes on to say, one’s personal identity is 
constituted by the “unity of the character which the unity of narrative requires” 
(p.116).  So for MacIntyre, a person’s actions can only be rendered intelligible in 
terms of the cohesive story of that person’s life.  Of course, many of the conclusions 
of both Schechtman and Macintyre have come under fire and have been challenged 
on a number of grounds. For instance, many postmodern oriented narratologists 
would take issue with MacIntyre’s insistence that lives are lived in narrative form and 
thus imply working towards a conclusion or telos, in his case to achieve “the good life 
for man” (1984, pp. 218-219).  I am also critical of MacIntyre’s dependence on the 
‘master narrative’ as the narratological backdrop against which our stories and moral 
actions make sense.  Following the postmodern and poststructuralist perspectives on 
claims of universality, I am not sure one can say with any certainty, as I believe 
MacIntyre does, that our stories of self need be necessarily matched up against the 
archetypal master narratives in the pursuit of a good life.  That said, I am also wary of 
assigning too much weight to the contingency (and potential slide into a particular 
kind of relativism that it seems to entail) of a strict postmodern/deconstructive 
perspective. A consistent critique of the postmodern intervention within the academy 
has been that it offers virtually no defense to the charges of relativism.  As critics 
have pointed out, the endless deconstruction of the notions of “narrative” or 
“identity”, for example, leave little room upon which to ground action.  Thus, while I 
am sympathetic to the general contours of the (postmodern) deconstruction of the 
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seemingly common-sense, yet socially contingent, definitions of gender or race, for 
example14, I side with Spivak, who has claimed that, “deconstruction cannot found a 
political program of any kind” (as quoted in Landry & MacLean, 1996, p. 6).  In other 
words, deconstruction as a purely theoretical endeavor seems to lack the kind of 
temporal and cultural fixedness that I argue for in the interpretation of sporting 
narratives and sporting autobiography.  In this sense, I want to suggest that the 
sporting narratives one invokes, interprets, (re)constructs, and has reflected back by 
others, are similarly shifting and negotiable, yet help to inform moral choices 
nonetheless when framed within the social fabric of their making. Regardless, it is 
important to recognize, as Atkinson (1997) and Hardwig (1998) point out, that even 
these subjective interpretations (of self and others) take place within a particular 
material and cultural context.  Moreover, as Coffey & Atkinson (1996) have 
suggested, even though the “biographical events” of a story may be unique to an 
individual, “they are structured according to socially shared conventions of 
reportage” (p. 61).   
 The view that our actions help to make up a more or less coherent story that 
we tell about ourselves is important for my purposes here.  If one accepts the notion 
that experiences can be crucial in how people see themselves on the one hand, and 
how one might incorporate, reflect, and act on those experiences in the future on the 
other, then the experience of physical activity and sport ought to be included, without 
much resistance by academics I would suspect, in the plot of one’s autobiography.  In 
other words, how people see themselves can be impacted by their experiences, 
 
14 Particularly as these theories can be utilized to mark social difference and thus serve to perpetuate 
oppression.  
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including their engagement with sport.  While it seems almost trite to suggest that a 
person’s experiences impact and color their moral decisions, it is the implicit 
foundation of both virtue and particularistic ethics15. 
As Sparkes (2004), drawing from Smith and Watson (2001) reminds us, by 
expanding on the work of both autobiographical studies and sociology, the body has 
increasingly been conceptualized as a “site for autobiographical knowledge, as well 
as a textual surface on which a person’s life is inscribed” (p. 398).  Further, for Smith 
and Watson (2001), the body is a site of autobiographical knowledge because 
memory itself is embodied, “and life narrative is a site of embodied knowledge 
because autobiographical narrators are embodied subjects.  Life narrative inextricably 
links memory, subjectivity, and the materiality of the body…” (p. 36).  In other 
words, in many respects, the body itself, and to a significant degree, sport and 
physical activity, inform, in a profound way, one’s sense of self and one’s 
epistemological and ethical framework.  In this sense, acknowledging the multiplicity 
of ways that people come to frame moral questions and the variety of texts, including 
the body as text that people seem to integrate into their complex stories, I have been 
arguing that the narrow conception of some narrative ethicists have overlooked 
important moral pathways that agents do seem to utilize when framing moral 
questions and making moral choices.  I call this notion of variable moral pathways, 
the moral conduit.  
 
 
 
15 For an in-depth treatment of particularist (or situational) ethics, see: Ulrik Kihlbom’s (2000) 
Guidance and Justification in Particularistic Ethics. Bioethics, 14; 287-309 
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The moral conduit 
A conduit can be thought of a means of transmitting or passing something.  In 
the case of a moral understanding, the concept of the conduit is an important 
metaphor for several reasons.  Most importantly, the notion of a moral conduit allows 
for the recognition of a multiplicity of paths to moral reasoning.  In fact, the 
connotation of a ‘conduit’ suggests that the appropriate channel will, in fact be 
employed.  In the case of sporting narratives, I am simply assuming that many people 
have a more (or at least equally) intimate relationship with athletics and physical 
activities than with reading the ‘right kinds’ of novels that have been suggested by 
some narrative ethicists, including Nussbaum and Rorty.  In a sense, some people 
may actually have a clearer understanding of certain moral issues through sport as 
autobiography or at least their understanding may be facilitated through an experience 
of viewing particular sport as narrative texts. 
The moral conduit view pulls together strains from both Schechtman (1996) 
and Walker (1987).  From Schechtman, I am taking the idea that a person’s life 
experiences are central to the kinds of moral decisions they will make. She calls this 
view that of narrative self-constitution.  Schechtman explains:  
According to the narrative self-constitution view, the difference between 
 persons and other individuals lies in how they organize their experiences, and 
 hence their lives.  At the core of this view is the assertion that individuals 
 constitute themselves as persons by coming to think of themselves as 
 persisting subjects who have had experiences in the past and will continue to 
 have experiences in the future…Some…individuals weave stories of their 
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 lives, and it is their doing so which makes them persons.  On this view a 
 person’s identity is constituted by the content of her self-narrative, and the 
 traits, actions, and experiences included in it are, by virtue of that inclusion, 
 hers. (1996, p.94) 
Unlike Schechtman, however, I do not hinge moral agency on telling the 
‘right’ kinds of stories, rather only that the storyteller seems to incorporate her 
experience (including athletic experiences) in her self-narrative.  That is not to say 
that telling morally dubious stories about oneself would not have potentially negative 
implications on one’s actions, but rather, that the stories that one tells do not have to 
line up (ala virtue ethics) with a kind of a priori notion of the good life.  I am 
advocating for far more social contextuality in my version of morality.    
From Walker (1987) I am appropriating a version of her moral particularity 
thesis (MPT).  Walker claims that, “there are identity constituting structures and 
features of an agent’s life which can give particular content to the agent’s moral 
position” (Walker 1987, p.171).  In this way, Walker wants to claim that the moral 
choices one makes are bound up in the actions and experiences that one has had in the 
past and therefore guide her actions along a continuum of possible choices given her 
life-history. In other words, the particulars of a person’s life are the things that she 
draws on to make moral decisions. Similarly, the idea of a moral-conduit recognizes 
that an array of experiences may be drawn upon (including sport and athletic 
activities) in order to help to fine tune her moral decision-making.        
It seems to be the case that there are different ways in which individuals may 
develop moral acuity.  I liken the connection that someone makes to a type of 
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narrative story (literature, or cinema, or sporting event) to the image of an old time 
telephone switchboard.  The operator can choose a multitude of connections via 
plugging and unplugging any number of connections on the switchboard, but in the 
end one connection just seems clearer than the others do.  That is, the person is 
confronted with less static.  
To go back to my notion of the variable effectiveness of particular kinds of 
narratives to do moral work, it is of crucial importance to place a person within the 
context of her or his own life story. MacIntyre (1984), Schectman (1996), and Rorty 
(1989) all recognize the significance of situating the person in the context of their 
own story.   
For example, if my story is that of an upper-class, well-read childhood, replete 
with boarding school pedigree, there is much higher likelihood (perhaps simply due 
to exposure of like-minded literature?) that I will pick up on the subtleties and moral 
messages that Nussbaum speaks about in the works of Henry James. On the other 
hand, if I grew up in a working-class neighborhood and never attended or graduated 
from college, I may have a greater likelihood of connecting some notion of the 
morally good life through my experience of particular (but altogether different) kinds 
of movies or literary works.  But what is interesting here is that both people may 
point to sport, and its figural importance in that agent’s life and incorporate it into the 
story that they tell about themselves.  Furthermore, it seems as though sport seen as a 
narrative text can move beyond some of the boundaries of race, gender, and class.  I 
will expand on this idea of moral mobility in the sport as reflexive narrative section 
below. 
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Seeing sport in this way, it seems possible to avoid the elitism that is 
embodied by the work of Nussbaum, Rorty (and perhaps Schechtman) that I have 
suggested elsewhere in this project.  Why are the moral possibilities of narrative only 
available through particular kinds of text (literary, for example)?  This is not to say 
that ‘anything goes’ so far as the narrative-carrying-moral-weight is concerned, but 
rather that, expanding the range of stories to be employed by Nussbaum’s method 
would make sense, given people’s various stances to the openness of particular kinds 
of narratives; precisely the kinds of narratives that ‘make sense’ given that person’s 
complex life-narrative. 
  With these contours in mind, I would like to turn my attention to two case 
studies, that of Lance Armstrong and Tosha Tsang, that help to illustrate the notion of 
sport as autobiography for moral purposes.  These stories, I believe, work on several 
different levels and help to highlight the main concepts of: the moral conduit 
(allowing for non-elite morally illuminating pathways), sport as autobiography 
(demonstrating how one integrates sporting experiences, both self-told and externally 
reflected, into their identity and story of self) and lastly, how both Tsang and 
Armstrong seem to reflect on those self-told stories in the process of moral 
deliberation or, at least, in some important moral way.  Last, I consider the ideas that 
Nelson (2001) has contributed about the narrative counterstory and argue that both 
Armstrong and Tsang’s stories could be thought of as sport-infused counterstories 
that have the benefit of reframing master narratives, of the weakness of illness in 
Armstrong’s case and of capitulating to the prevailing gender logic in Tsang’s, that 
have been, arguably, oppressive and limiting.    
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Case Study: Lance Armstrong 
Consider first the case of six-time Tour de France champion Lance 
Armstrong.  Armstrong overcame testicular cancer and staged one of the most 
remarkable comebacks in contemporary sport (Butryn & Masucci, 2003; Sparkes, 
2004).  His best selling autobiographies, It’s Not About the Bike: My Journey Back to 
Life (2000), and Every Second Counts (2003) explore the experience of Armstrong’s 
illness, recovery and return to cycling’s top-ranks.  Sparkes (2004) succinctly lays the 
foundation for Armstrong’s story when he summarizes: 
In 1996, Lance Armstrong was one of the top-ranked cyclists in the world.  In 
the same year, he was also diagnosed with stage 4 testicular cancer that had 
spread to his brain and lungs, giving him below a 40% chance of survival.  
Less than 3 years after being diagnosed, having undergone surgery to remove 
a testicle, and following chemotherapy treatment, brain surgery, and the 
subsequent remission of the disease, Armstrong won the Tour de France in 
1999. (p. 397)  
To be sure, as Butryn and Masucci (2003) have suggested, Armstrong’s remarkable 
recovery from cancer and subsequent victory in the 1999 (and following 5 
consecutive) Tour de France was, “perhaps the most astonishing comeback in 
contemporary sport history” (p. 124). 
Armstrong’s case furnishes a dramatic example of how a person’s experience 
of sport not only serves to frame an important part of his or her life-story, but 
importantly seems to help frame important moral issues.  I will detail several 
instances in Armstrong’s story-of-self where sport and his illness as mediated through 
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his relationship with sport clearly figure importantly into his moral deliberations, 
particularly as these reflections guide and motivate morally good actions or, at the 
very least, a certain reflexivity about his journey from a brash, self-centered 
professional athlete to a willing ambassador and beacon of hope for those living with 
or surviving cancer.  I’ll return to Armstrong’s narrative below, but it is important to 
situate his particular story, especially as it relates to moral issues, within the larger 
context of so-called illness narratives.  
Armstrong’s story of overcoming great odds to ‘defeat’ cancer echo the 
discourse on illness narrative(s) often associated with Arthur Frank.  As a cancer 
survivor and a trained philosopher and sociologist, Frank has written extensively on 
the moral and ethical implications of illness narratives (1995, 1997, 2000, 2002).  
Frank asserts that, “illness is an occasion for autobiography, and memoirs of illness 
present openings to ethical ways of living” (2000, p. 135).  While Frank’s perspective 
focuses exclusively on illness, rather than sport, it is still useful to explore how and in 
what ways articulating the self through the lens of illness helps to inform one’s moral 
self.  Moreover, as I take up below, and as articulated by Sparkes (2004), 
Armstrong’s story is intimately tied to the intersection of his sporting body and his 
illness body as reflected in his autobiography.  It is rather difficult to separate 
Armstrong’s story from his experience of having cancer.  Clearly, that experience has 
almost created bifurcated understanding of self; pre-cancer Armstrong and post-
cancer Armstrong.  The interesting and underlying identification, which is 
significantly challenged by the encroachment of the cancer, is Armstrong’s 
understanding of himself as athlete.  As Armstrong (2000) states:  
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There are two Lance Armstrongs, pre-cancer and post.  Everybody’s favorite 
 question is ‘How did cancer change you?’  The real question is how did it not 
 change me.  I left my house on October 2, 1996, as one person and came 
 home another….I returned a different person.  In a way the old me did die, 
 and I was given a second chance…Even my body is different, because during 
 the chemo-therapy I lost all the muscle I had ever built up, and even when I 
 recovered, it didn’t come back in the same way.  (p. 4) 
But this transformation could have only been possible, in an important way, 
because of Armstrong’s intimate identification as an athlete.  Yet, even as the illness 
shakes Armstrong identity as an athlete, it is exactly that (athletic) identification that 
he draws on in order to help make sense of his new reality as a cancer patient and 
eventual survivor.  Armstrong ‘attacks’ the illness with the same intensity as he had  
once attacked the roads of  Europe in route to becoming the youngest world road 
racing champion in cycling history (Armstrong, 2000; Butryn & Masucci, 2003). 
As Armstrong (2000) articulates:  
 The physical pain of cancer didn’t bother me so much, because I was used to 
 it.  In fact, if I didn’t suffer, I’d feel cheated.  The more I thought about it, the 
 more cancer began to seem like a race to me.  Only the destination had 
 changed.  They shared grueling physical aspects, as well as a dependence on 
 time, and progress reports every interval, with checkpoints and a slavish 
 reliance on numbers and blood tests.  (p. 89)  
So for Armstrong, the acceptance and confrontation of cancer is intimately tied to his 
understanding of himself as an athlete, and as such, it becomes just one of the series 
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of challenges he has overcome on the road to athletic success.  Moreover, as Sparkes 
(2004) reminds us, Armstrong is able to tolerate the harsh demands of his cancer 
treatment, in part, because of his self-told story of the suffering demanded of an 
athlete in the professional cycling ranks.  Sparks claims that, for Armstrong “medical 
compliance demands a disciplined and dominating body that Armstrong has 
constructed over the years in sport” (p. 413).  It is this very juxtaposition that begins 
to inform Armstrong’s awareness of his dual role as athlete and as cancer fighter and 
survivor.  Indeed, it is his athletic public self that seems to be the catalyst, in part, for 
his emergence as an important figure in the world of cancer survivorship.  Yet, his 
internal recognition that, as a notable athlete, who fights and beats cancer, his 
obligations are starting to lie increasingly beyond winning his next race and 
promoting his main corporate sponsors, but as an emissary of survivorship itself, or, 
as his doctor so eloquently puts it in Armstrong’s autobiography, “the obligation of 
the cured” (p. 154).      
 It is exactly Armstrong’s paradoxical relationship to himself as an athlete that 
gives him the capacity to move beyond those, oftentimes, indulgent and selfish 
pursuits.  His reckoning of himself as someone with a potentially fatal illness, serves 
to provide the backdrop against which he begins to see himself in both a bigger and 
smaller context-bigger in that he has begun to realize the obligation he has as a high-
profile athlete and cancer survivor, and smaller because he is faced with his own 
mortality and the existential questioning about one’s place in the larger scheme of 
things that often goes with that realization.  As Armstrong (2000) notes, “my illness 
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was humbling and starkly revealing, and it forced me to survey my life with an 
unforgiving eye” (p. 4).  He goes on to say: 
 One definition of “human” is as follows:  characteristics of people as opposed 
 to God or animals or machines, especially susceptible to weakness, and 
 therefore showing the qualities of man.  Athletes don’t tend to think of 
 themselves in these terms; they’re too busy cultivating the aura of invincibility 
 to admit to being fearful, weak, defenseless, vulnerable, or fallible, and for 
 that reason neither are they kind, considerate, merciful, benign, lenient, or 
 forgiving to themselves or anyone else around them.  But as I sat in my house 
 alone that first night [after being diagnosed with cancer], it was humbling to 
 be so scared.  More than that, it was humanizing.  (pp. 73-74)  
 While Armstrong clearly seems to have integrated his sporting self into his 
identity, he is now confronted with challenging the less-than-positive elements of that 
identity as they seem to be in stark contrast to the larger obligations revealed in and 
through his bout with cancer.  While I have been arguing all along that sporting 
narrative, and in this particular case, sport as autobiography, can be integrated into 
one’s identity and leaned on for moral purposes, it is just as significant to grapple 
with when and where those sporting identifications seem to have the opposite 
outcome insomuch as Armstrong must now come to terms with the fact that prior to 
cancer, his concern for others (a moral issue to be sure) seemed marginal at best.  
Moreover, Armstrong, upon this realization, must figure out a way to reconcile those 
old ways of being an athlete with his new responsibility as a cancer survivor.  
Invariably, Armstrong’s sporting self undergoes a change as well.  While still focused 
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on racing his bike at the highest levels (post-cancer), he also reflects that, “I believe I 
have an obligation to make something more out of my life than before, and help my 
fellow human beings who are dealing with the disease” (p. 274).  
 While it is clear that the intersection of Armstrong’s illness and his conception 
of himself as a professional bike racer, as recounted in his autobiography, have 
impacted him in important ways, how does it do moral work of some kind?  It is here 
that Nelson’s idea of his counterstory can help us to contextualize Armstrong’s 
narrative in moral terms.  Recall that the narrative counterstory does two things: it 
helps to reframe oppressive master narratives and it can help to reconstitute the 
infiltrated consciousness of those deemed as less than full moral agents by the 
oppressive master narratives.  I argue that Armstrong’s autobiography has elements of 
each of these intended outcomes.   
 In saying that Armstrong’s16 autobiography can be construed as a master 
narrative challenging counterstory, I am thinking about the ways in which his illness 
narrative at first succumbs to the usual cultural understandings of powerlessness in 
the face of the disease, or, at least, of the silence that often accompanies a diagnosis 
of cancer.  Armstrong, as well, is forced to confront the convoluted messages about 
masculinity that are told and re-told through, not only sporting master narratives, but 
other stories of male courage and strength as well.  Ironically, by embracing those 
powerful cultural messages or, more likely, by not reflecting on their domination, 
Armstrong shrugs off the very overt early warning signs of testicular cancer, thereby 
 
16 I recognize the fact that Armstrong himself benefits from significant levels of social privilege, yet, as 
his story relates to larger disempowering stories of illness and of cancer particularly, I find it 
compelling nonetheless.   
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elevating the risk of incurability by a significant measure.  As Sparkes (2004) reflects, 
“Armstrong’s autobiography and how he interprets events in his life are shaped and 
constrained by a number of dominant narratives that operate within Western cultures 
in relation to individualism, [and] heroic masculinity…” (p. 422).  So Armstrong’s 
story, while situated alongside these dominant stories of masculinity, and illness, can 
help to reframe the public discourse on both in an important way.  On the one hand, 
by vocalizing the ‘stubbornness’ of men to eschew the obvious symptoms of 
testicular cancer, Armstrong’s autobiography can, in some small way, serve to 
challenge the negative consequences of a strict adherence to traditional masculine 
roles.  Again, as Sparkes (2004) notes, “Armstrong’s autobiography, as a narrative 
map, therefore, provides one way of interpreting, experiencing, and responding to 
serious illness” (p. 423).  In this sense, Armstrong’s illness/sporting narrative perhaps 
provides important inroads into the reclamation of agency, empowerment, and respect 
for those who have cancer, on the one hand, and a redescription of the limiting master 
narratives vis-à-vis challenging traditional gender role expectations as it relates to 
sickness, on the other.  
 But, Armstrong’s autobiography can be seen to work in the second way that 
Nelson (2001) speaks of as well.  What becomes evident when reading Armstrong’s 
autobiography is that he himself seems to undergo a metamorphosis; one which 
serves to (again) challenge egocentric and arguably other-alienating singular pursuit 
of sporting goals, with the recognition that one ought to take one’s responsibilities to 
other fellow human beings more seriously.  Armstrong (2000, 2003) articulates that, 
faced with one’s own mortality, things become reprioritized.  The single-minded 
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pursuit of winning bicycle races, while obviously still important to Armstrong, yield 
to the recognition that, to continue living in a vacuum and without regard for the 
circumstances of others, is simply, irresponsible.   
 In this way, it is possible to interpret Armstrong’s autobiography through the 
lens of the counterstory and demonstrate how Armstrong is able to challenge the 
messages that are communicated via certain master narratives as they relate to issues 
of masculinity and sport, for example.  While Nelson (2001) does not directly address 
the possibility of an autobiographical redescription of one with considerably more 
social privilege-she focuses on those who have been historically marginalized by the 
master narratives-it seems fruitful to explore, as the self-told story of Armstrong does, 
the possibility of reexamining one’s own privileges through a type of counterstory 
(that is predicated on both sport and illness) that help one to reflexively examine and 
reintegrate more caring and respectful reckoning and treatment of others as a result.           
       
Case Study:  Tosha Tsang 
Tosha Tsang (2000) also provides a striking account of what I mean by sport 
as autobiography.  According to Sparkes (2002), “Tsang allows both herself and her 
audience to explore a variety of nuanced ways of knowing oneself in and through 
sport-for example, as a women, as an academic, and as a heterosexual Chinese-Anglo 
feminist” (p. 80).  Tsang writes about how her experiences as an elite level rower 
have helped to articulate her identity in significant ways: 
Using the narrative form I create a space for a variety of my voices to emerge- 
including both my academic and my athletic voices.  Narrative also allows me 
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to show how different stories-stories of gender and racialization-are told, 
while exploring my identity and how the multiplicity of stories mirrors the 
hybridity or ambiguity of identity. (Tsang 2000, p. 44) 
She convincingly argues for the usefulness of narrative as a form to represent her 
“experiences of identity within high-performance sport” (p. 45).  Moreover, Tsang 
uses her personal reflective “self-narrative” (p. 45), to weave together her sport 
experiences with what she calls her “sense-making” stories which, as she continues:  
 Are the stories I tell myself and others to explain some of the meanings of my 
 experiences.  I explore the usefulness of narrative form by experimenting with 
 narratives of self and, through autobiographical accounts, tell my own stories 
 of identity within high-performance sport.  (Tsang 2000, p. 45) 
Tsang also suggests that narrative representations of research can serve the useful 
function of democratizing the findings in ways that are more accessible to the non-
academic.  She goes on to propose, following Richardson (1995) that if, “narrative is 
the primary way through which humans organize their experiences into temporally 
meaningful episodes” (2000, p. 45), then research written in the narrative form could 
be more accessible to, the participant (whose experience is told in narrative form), the 
others who many not have access to research written in a more formal (scientific) 
style, and lastly, to those who may not have the theoretical framework to understand 
more formal academic research but, “who could interact with the material in a 
different way-in a storied way” (p. 45).17     
 
17 I find it important that I have been similarly arguing for a shift in the acceptable narratives that some 
philosophers have been suggesting for examination with a narrative ethics approach.  At the very least, 
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 Tsang’s account helps to illustrate the way that people often synthesize 
their life experiences in terms of sport in morally significant ways.  Moreover, for 
Tsang, as for Armstrong, it is apparent that reflecting on her athletic experience 
helped hone her ability to perceive and make sense of potentially complex moral 
questions, including questions of gender, identity, race, ethnicity and the like. 
Tsang’s narrative of her experience gives the reader a keen look into the 
complicated negotiation of gender role expectations, homophobia, nationalism, 
identity, and identification that are bound up in her sporting experience.  Clearly, an 
important part of the story that Tsang tells about herself has to do with her experience 
as an elite-level rower.  Furthermore, her autobiographical reflections on that 
experience have profoundly informed her moral decisions.  For example, Tsang’s 
decision not to shave her legs, as she recounts in one vignette,  represents a 
significant resistance to the cultural expectation that woman should acquiesce to the 
“North American beauty standard” (p. 49).  In addition, her “(in)action” interrupts 
‘common sense’ notions of femininity and gender.  While these decisions are 
obviously and outwardly political, one gets a sense when reading her account that the 
decision also has profound intersubjective significance.  
The story of Tsang’s “Hairy Legs” is noteworthy for the reader, as a 
profoundly insightful interpretation of cultural values and norms, but importantly for 
Tsang herself as she struggles with the negotiation of multiple-selves and the 
deliberations and actions that are tied together through those self-identifications.  
Moreover, Tsang has to struggle with conflicted feelings and actions towards her 
 
it seems to corroborate the value, in both the social science and in philosophy, of reexamining the ways 
in which questions are investigated and articulated.  
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female teammates, most of whom sport clean-shaven legs. The story Tsang tells, “is 
based on an incident in which one of her teammates in the Canadian National Rowing 
team half-jokingly asks Tsang if she is going to shave her legs before the Olympics” 
(Sparkes 2002, pp. 80-81).  As Tsang goes on to explain, the moment has multiple 
meanings for her.  On the one hand, it is very much a story about gender, and as I 
have said above, about conforming to a socially constructed beauty standard, while on 
the other hand, it is a story of “association” (Tsang 2000, p. 49) with the Canadian 
National team and being the ‘right’ kind of ambassadors.  As Tsang (2001) reflects: 
What we do (and look like) reflects back on our country, on other Canadians. 
 We are representatives of our country and as (female) athletes, we are 
 expected to conduct ourselves accordingly (be feminine, shave our legs).  
 Some may feel the pressure of this message more strongly than others and 
 circulate it to those of us who do not appear to “hear” it” (p. 49). 
 Importantly, Tsang’s story works as exactly the kind of counterstory that 
Nelson has described, because Tsang’s decision to reject the conformity of the 
shaved-leg-beauty-standard seems to disrupt the prevalent master narratives about 
gender, femininity, and conformity.  Moreover, Tsang’s conversation with a fellow 
teammate regarding the issue of her non-shaved legs also provides an opportunity to 
reframe that team member’s ‘infiltrated’ and internalized compliance with the 
arbitrary gender ‘norms’.  In recounting that conversation, Tsang (2001) says: 
 I press her further, and the conversation spins of into a rare non-rowing 
 discussion on the topic of conformity and standards and rules of society.  It is 
 a glimpse of some of the differences (heterogeneity) between us that get 
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 veneered under the identity of elite athlete (homogenizing) that we are 
 usually organized/subsumed under. (p. 49)  
Sport as autobiography, in the sense I have been advocating, can be read (by 
Tsang) and also works to shape her moral framework as it relates to her conscious 
decision (despite the possibly divisive consequences for team cohesion) not to shave 
her legs.  This overt decision is a moral one in that it most certainly allows for Tsang 
to exercise her moral agency, as Nelson (2001) has suggested, in ways that challenge 
master narratives.  By ‘telling’ her story (or letting her hairy legs tell a story for her), 
Tsang seems to legitimate the important component of her identity as a rower, a 
woman, and a member of the national team.  In this sense, Tsang casts off the identity 
that others would have her conform to, and thus, becomes a more freely acting moral 
agent herself.  Importantly, her decision to not-shave her legs does not, in turn, end up 
being oppressive to others in its own right, as that outcome would seem to be 
inconsistent with the very premise of the value of counterstories.   
Nelson (2001) outlines three ways that counterstories resist oppressive master 
narrative; refusal, repudiation, and contestation (pp. 170-172).  Tsang’s leg-shaving 
decision seems to fall into the later, more persuasive, category of contestation.  
According to Nelson (2001), contestations of the oppressive master narratives are 
predicated on the, “self-understanding generated by their counterstory for the political 
purpose of challenging, in the public domain, the dominant perception of the 
subgroup” (p. 171).  Tsang’s seemingly individual act, then, has far-reaching 
implications since the act demands to be contrasted to the dominant reading of 
feminine beauty, for example.  In this particular case, Tsang’s refusal to acquiesce to 
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that standard seems to get at the very point of the counterstory in the first place since, 
as Nelson claims, “the point of the counterstory is to repair systematically the damage 
done to identity from both the first-person and the dominant perspective” (p. 171). 
For Tsang, her team members and for the larger public, the arguably ‘selfish’ 
choice to resist larger cultural expectation is far from singularly political.  Indeed, as 
Nelson (2001) reminds us, the real value of telling counterstories lies in the 
possibility that, “damaged identities can be narratively repaired” and as she 
concludes, help us to reflect on and contribute to, “our understanding of the role of 
stories in our moral lives” (pp. 187-188).    
 
Lessons Learned 
Armstrong and Tsang’s stories offer useful examples of the sense in which 
I am talking about sport as autobiography.  Sport participation can be 
incorporated in the complex intersection of identity-forming experiences within 
the life of the participant.  As such, it seems possible that one’s moral perceptions 
could be significantly impacted by that participation.  In addition, morally good 
actions may be guided and motivated by these stories and their incorporation into 
one’s autobiography.   
That is not to say that one’s moral perceptions could not be clouded by 
their sport experiences (and subsequent reflection on them), but the same could be 
said of even the most sophisticated literature.  For while reading and reflecting on 
appropriately complex literature can be morally edifying, it is also possible for the 
reader to develop an affinity with morally dubious characters.  I have also argued 
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for the importance of recognizing how sport as autobiography can be 
representative of what I have called a moral conduit.  As you will recall, the 
notion of the moral conduit is presented in direct opposition to the suggestions of 
Nussbaum, Rorty, and others who claim that moral choice is best honed by paying 
attention to the nuanced moral deliberations of characters in the decidedly “high-
culture” world of classic literature.   
By contrast, the recognition that both Armstrong, and Tsang’s self-
articulated sport stories have served as useful moral reflections, only serves to 
support the idea that multiple paths to moral deliberation are in fact incorporated 
into one’s moral choice-making framework.  Moreover, the utility of recognizing 
sport stories particularly is that they are seemingly far more accessible than 
sophisticated literature and therefore serve to “democratize” the paths of moral 
deliberation.  
Lastly, I think a strong case can be made for seeing how sport 
autobiographies can often be set against moral-agency-stripping master narratives, 
especially as they relate to reframing one’s own infiltrated consciousness, thus, 
establishing the autobiographer as full and complete moral agent and one who, 
says Nelson (2001) may be more likely to act in the interest of good, as a result of 
that moral reclamation.      
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CHAPTER V  
 
SPORT AS REFLEXIVE NARRATIVE:  TWO CASE STUDIES 
 
 
In this chapter, I present two case studies, Billie Jean King vs. Bobby Riggs 
and the Algerian distance runner Hassiba Boulmerka, that help to illustrate a second 
type of sport narrative-reflexive narrative-that, I argue, can be read for moral 
meanings.  The moral significance of reflecting on sport as reflexive narrative has to 
do with the potential moral impact of viewing particular sporting events.  While, it 
seems that the media is bursting with images of morally deplorable actions 
perpetrated by many high-profile athletes,  I am not claiming that any and all sporting 
events can ‘do moral work’, rather I am simply claiming that if some sporting event, 
when viewed, can be construed as having greater moral significance by and 
individual or, in some cases, more generally, then those texts ought to be included 
alongside the texts often pointed to by narrative ethicists as having something 
important to say about the moral world.  So, here again, I am arguing in favor of 
expanding the limits of what constitutes a morally edifying story (for the reader) by 
supplementing, not only the kind of story that can be read, but the moral agent that 
perhaps benefits from that expanded rendering of an appropriate story.          
    
Sport as Reflexive Narrative 
 Sport as reflexive narrative centers on one’s experience of viewing a 
particular kind of sporting event and subsequently reflecting on the morally edifying 
themes that can be drawn from that reflection.  I call this type of narrative reflexive 
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because this term conveys the openness of the viewer to alternative readings of the 
event and the willingness to incorporate these readings into his or her moral 
framework in some way.  Following Nelson (2001),for example, as I will introduce 
below, certain sporting events when read reflexively, can illuminate important moral 
issues-the fair treatment of historically marginalized people, for example.  In addition, 
I draw on elements from Birrell and McDonald (1999, 2000) as well as Hochstetler 
(2003) in claiming that certain sporting events can be read as texts, on the one hand, 
and reflected upon and integrated into one’s moral constellation on the other.   
Birrell and McDonald (1999, 2000) have made important contributions to the 
academic discipline of critical sport studies.  In 1999, they introduced a methodology 
for interrogating power called reading sport critically, which sought to outline a 
critical analytical strategy as well as lay out the theoretical and epistemological issues 
that make up their method’s foundation (McDonald and Birrell, 1999 p. 283).  An 
important insight that McDonald and Birrell’s methodology hinges on, has to do with 
the recognition that an increasing number of critical sport analyses seem to 
conceptualize particular sporting events or celebrities as texts and “offer a reading of 
those texts” (p. 283).  This shift to interpret non-literary cultural forms as texts is 
significant, as they say: 
Because it ties sport scholars to other critical scholars in terms of the 
 theoretical and methodological choices we make as cultural critics.  And we 
 find the analyses themselves compelling because they concern the popular yet 
 deceptively innocent cultural form of sport.  Thus they offer insight into how 
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 to connect seemingly discreet incidents and events that are generated within 
 the world of sport to the larger social world.  (p. 283) 
By drawing from poststructuralist and postmodern readings of narrative, McDonald 
and Birrell embrace the possibility of multiple meanings of sporting events, or 
particular celebrities.  However, their critique (and mine) is not interested in simply 
offering an endless deconstructive rediscription of those events to the point of 
meaninglessness; rather they state quite clearly that the purpose of their work is to 
engage these texts with an eye toward laying bare the power structures that are at 
work and embedded within a critical read of the events.  Moreover, and important for 
my conception of sport as reflexive narrative, they:  
 Advocate reading sport critically as a methodology for uncovering, 
 foregrounding, and producing counter-narratives, that is, alternative accounts 
 of particular incidents and celebrities that have been decentered, obscured, and 
 dismissed by hegemonic forces.  Counter-narratives are narratives infused 
 with resistant political possibilities. (p. 295)  
 So for McDonald and Birrell, as well as for Nelson, one important reason to 
pay attention to stories, whether articulated as ‘oppressive master narratives’ or as 
embodied in the seemingly trivial Tonya Hardin-Nancy Kerrigan saga, is because a 
careful read of these narratives allows for a politically and morally potent counter-
read, and subsequent counternarrative that serves to empower and mobilize.  These 
are the contours I have in mind when suggesting that sport can be both read as text, 
and read for moral meaning.  
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 Hochstetler (2003) also offers a useful perspective on reading sport for moral 
purposes.  He, too, is convinced of the integral role that stories play in our lives and 
suggests that we learn important lessons through stories.  Undoubtedly, he submits, 
“we learn through these stories…about beliefs and ideas, good and evil” (p. 1).  
Hochstetler is interested in the ways in which certain sport stories can be used as 
educative tools for moral purposes by utilizing a virtue ethics perspective whereby 
morally estimable choices stand out as exemplars and, he goes on, sporting stories 
that uphold these virtuous acts ought to be aspired to. Of interest to me in this 
perspective, however, is Hochstetler’s notion that, following Noddings (1993), stories 
can be used, “to frame moral issues” (p. 9).  He goes on to say that, narratives can 
highlight common moral issues in sport.   
 What is important about Hochstetler’s position, for my project, is that he too 
recognizes that sport narratives can help to frame moral issues and draw our attention 
to them in important ways, perhaps, that other forms of moral discourse cannot.  Take 
the BALCO doping scandal, for instance.  While it may be fair to say that the use of 
performance enhancing drugs by athletes sheds a morally dubious light on sport in 
general, it is also accurate to say that the issue (or issues similar to it) would receive 
little or no attention if not for being framed by the sport discourses surrounding drug 
usage.  While I’ll beg off a discussion of the doping issue for now, I would like to say 
a few words about the idea that sport narrative can be seen to democratize moral 
agency to one degree or another.  I call this notion moral mobility.                   
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Moral mobility 
Another important feature of seeing sport-as-stories is embodied in the 
concept of moral mobility.  As I stated above, moral mobility has to do with the 
utilization of sporting narratives by a wide variety of people across gender, race, 
ethnicity and class.  This concept is really an extension and outcome of 
acknowledging the existence of different moral conduits in narrative ethics.  On this 
view, if one accepts sporting narratives as appropriate instances of moral refinement 
(as a valuable moral conduit), then one must also allow for the possibility of 
welcoming more people into the ranks of the morally refinable.  In other words, moral 
mobility has to do with the shift in the categorization of persons as full moral agents 
in light of potential refinement of moral perception.  While it may seem intuitive that 
most persons (on many accounts of morality) are accorded full status as moral agents, 
I simply point out that ethicists like Nussbaum and Rorty simply do not address the 
moral status of anyone other than the sophisticated reader.  Is this an oversight on 
their part?  I should hope so considering their proclaimed commitment to addressing 
issues of social justice.  However, I think that it is significant to explore what is not 
said as well as what is.      
Moral mobility then, has two key features, both of which deal with the 
recognition of full moral agency (both by the moral philosophers and by those with 
significant social privilege).  The first has to do with the general cultural feature of 
the experience of sport.  While it is true that there will be a large array of experiences 
that people from different social locations will have access to, I argue that sport as 
autobiography and sport as narrative text move across these socially constructed 
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boundaries.  Insofar as people from different backgrounds and experiences participate 
in similar sport activities, the activities serve as a common moral conduit, allowing 
them to use the sport narrative to similar ends.  In other words, since both an African-
American woman and a well-off white man typically view sport as an important 
aspect of the story they tell about themselves, it is possible to say that each has equal 
access to the utilization of that mode of moral refinement.  This is in contrast to 
Nussbaum, who would say that only those with a certain level of moral and 
intellectual acumen would be able to use James to their advantage.     
A second and equally important feature of the concept of moral-mobility has 
to do with the recognition of those from other social locations as a result of 
employing sporting narratives. This aspect of moral mobility has more to do with the 
result of seeing sport as narrative text.  We can turn to the King/Riggs match again to 
see an example of this feature of moral-mobility. It is conceivable that a man 
watching the match might have a different moral perception of woman after watching 
King defeat Riggs. He might then use this revelation to alter his moral framework 
with respect to his sexist attitudes towards woman.  Similarly, a woman might view 
the match and have her consciousness raised in such a way as to alter her unknowing 
acquiescence to sexist treatment.  In both instances, there is a significant kind of 
shifting of the way one person sees the other. 
 
Case Study:  Billie Jean King vs. Bobby Riggs 
 Take the 1973 tennis match between Billie Jean King and Bobby Riggs, for 
example.  In summarizing the larger social implications, Rader (1996) claims that the 
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match, “became a dramatic focal point for both the woman’s struggle for greater 
opportunity in sport and for the feminist movement in general” (p. 309). Reflecting 
on Riggs’ death in 1995, Billie Jean King remembers the moment she realized that 
she was going to have to play him: 
I walked down the aisle of the plane with lockjaw, because I knew I would 
have to play him.  All of the implications of the match flashed through my 
mind: It would be for Title IX legislation and the women’s movement and all 
of the inequalities women felt so deeply (King, 1996, p. 118). 
In an 1998 interview with Newsweek magazine, when asked what was going through 
her mind just before the match, King, again demonstrating an understanding of the 
larger implications of the match responded, “Well, as I sat in the locker room waiting 
to vomit, I kept thinking this was not about a tennis match, this was about social 
change.  I had to win.  It was life or death” (Starr, p. 90) 
Regardless of the fact that Riggs was known as a hustler, the match took on a 
significance that was much greater than the simple outcome of the game. I want to 
suggest that it is possible to view the match as a symbolic challenge to the white, 
heterosexual, middle-class patriarchy and to its morally superior underpinnings.  
Viewing the match in this way, as a story that challenges the traditional values of the 
cultural time and place, may help the “reader” of this text alter her or his beliefs and 
actions. 
 The match, was not only a spectacle but, as Spencer (2000) explains, a 
popular one; 
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In a match played at the Houston Astrodome before an estimated crowd of 
 30,472, King beat Riggs decisively in straight sets (6-4, 6-3, 6-3).  In addition 
 to playing before the largest live audience ever to witness a tennis match, the 
 contest was telecast worldwide.  Gallagher (1973) reported that overnight 
 Trenex ratings indicated that 48,000,000 Americans watched while ABC 
 garnered an estimated 52% of the viewing audience.  (p. 386) 
These staggering figures serve to frame popularity of, not only sport, but of 
the novel idea (at the time) of a women competing at the same level as a (albeit much 
older) man.  However, lest we think that these particular issues have been laid to rest, 
one only needs to reflect on the comments of several golfers, including Vijay Singh18 
on the PGA tour when Anika Sorenstam was given an opportunity to play in a men’s 
tournament to realize, that these issues are, perhaps as relevant today, as they were 
almost 30 years ago. 
Borrowing from Nelson (2001) once more, the King-Riggs match could 
certainly be read as having the potential to dislodge, in a very public way, the many 
standing traditional and cultural stories about male superiority and female 
subordination.  Moreover, and especially because the backdrop was a sporting event, 
that message was amplified since sport has been seen as an important (and revered) 
male domain (English, 1978). So, the match had the possibility of redescribing female 
strength and ability, in quite an accessible, yet no less profound way, and thus, 
framing the public discourse on (full) moral agency in a meaningful way.  
 
18 In an interview with the Associated Press, Singh said that he would withdraw if paired with 
Sorenstam at the tournament, and moreover, the she did not belong in a men’s tournament in the first 
place. 
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This “reading” of the Riggs vs. King Tennis match (as a reflexive sporting 
narrative) reveals how the story serves as a counternarrative to the unmarked 
construction of gender.  In this way, the Riggs/King match helps to dis-articulate the 
idea that men are the ‘natural’ athletic superiors to women.  This undermining of the 
taken-for-granted dominant/subordinate gender role expectations of men and woman 
(respectively) can help to reframe moral possibilities and subsequent actions.  All that 
is required of the “reader” here, to reiterate, is that they are open to differentiated 
readings of the match and that this alternative reading impact the refinement of one’s 
moral perception and deliberation.  
In this sense, it is possible that a male viewer of that match could be moved to 
re-evaluate both his privilege as a man (in a patriarchal society) as well as the 
potentiality of woman in a more general sense.  Of course, this claim is predicated on 
several things.  First, that the male viewer is appropriately attuned to the complex 
issues at hand in the event.  Second, that the viewer is alert and aware enough to see 
the event as the final chapter of a much larger and more complicated story, e.g. the 
culmination of feminist claims about societal inequalities in the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA) period of the 1970’s, and the eradication of sexist practices in the 
work place, among other concerns.  As Spencer (2000) relates, “whether it led to 
symbolic or real effects…King’s victory made it safe to be a feminist” (p. 387).   
 
Case Study:  Hassiba Boulmerka 
Hassiba Boulmerka’s story provides another example of narrative as reflexive 
text for which I have been arguing.  Boulmerka’s athletic credentials place her among 
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the elite middle-distance runners of the early 1990’s.  As Hargreaves (2000) explains, 
“In the 1988 All-Africa Games, Boulmerka won both the 800-and 1500-meter races, 
and she became the first Algerian woman to win a World Athletic Championships 
title when she took the 1500 meters in Tokyo in 1991” (p. 61)  and was the 1992 
Olympic Gold Medal winner.  However, as Morgan describes: 
 (Her) extraordinary athletic accomplishments were at first widely hailed by 
 her fellow Algerians, despite her clear violation of the strict Muslim code of 
 purdah (which decrees, among other things, that women be covered from head 
 to toe in public), but were later scorned by a vocal and increasingly influential 
 group of fundamentalist Muslims. (1998, p. 346). 
Indeed, even though her accomplishments were hailed at the time in Algeria, those 
accolades would be short-lived.  While her fellow World’s gold medal winner in the 
1500 meter men’s race would continue to be treated as a national hero, Boulmerka, 
according to Hargreaves (2000):   
 Quickly became the target of condemnation for militant Muslims 
 (characterized as the ‘more faithful’), who were encouraged by a 
 strengthening of Islamism.  In mosques throught the country, fundamentalist 
 imams who were affiliated to the Front Islamique di Salut (FIS) pronounced a 
 kofr – a public disavowal of Boulmerka.  The object of their condemnation 
 was her body – they argued that because she ran in shorts and vest in public, 
 she had broken the rules of the Qu’ran (pp. 61-62) 
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 Witnessing Boulmerka’s performance in the 1992 Olympics can be seen and 
understood as the kind of story that can impact the moral outlook of the viewer.  As in 
the case of the tennis match between Riggs and King, those who were following the 
‘story’ of Boulmerka’s struggles, perhaps, seem to benefit particularly from this kind 
of in-depth reading.  However, for those who paid close attention (especially her 
fellow Algerians, both male and female) to the larger ‘plot’ of the story, e.g. the 
political unrest in Algeria coupled with the resistance of some women to the code of 
purdah, it can be argued that the climax of the story (in this case, Boulmerka’s 
dedication of her gold medal to the assassinated former president of her country) 
indeed has the potential to help refine the moral acuity of some onlookers. 
If one takes seriously the idea of sport as reflexive narrative, it is possible to 
recast Boulmerka's story in a significantly tranformative light.  Seen in this way, 
Boulmerka's accomplishments offer both Algerian men and woman an alternative 
view of what it means to be a Muslim, one rich in moral possibility.  Boulmerka 
herself understands the larger implications of her "story."  Reflecting on the added 
pressure of being a top contender for the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, Boulmerka 
remarks that she has: 
Become a representative of all Algeria and of young woman in particular.  I've 
gotten so many letters wishing me courage.  Often they ask for a photo, but 
when I send one, I mustn't write my name on the envelope if it is to get there 
(quoted in Moore, 1992, p.54). 
It is clear from her comments that many Algerian women have come to "read" the 
story of Boulmerka's success as transcending athletic accomplishment. Many Muslim 
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women view her success as a direct challenge to conservative Islamic doctrine.  
Moreover, Boulmerka's story represents a potential reconciliation of conservative and 
more progressive iterations of the Islamic faith.  In fact, in reflecting on her gold 
medal in the 1500 meters at the 2000 Sydney Olympics, Algerian runner Nouria 
Merah-Benida said, “It’s for the Arab woman so that they can develop like the other 
woman of the world” (Williams, Guardian 2/10/00 as quoted in Hargreaves 2000, 
p.64), a sentiment perhaps not possible had it not been for the groundbreaking 
performance of Boulmerka in 1992. 
 
Lessons Learned 
 The stories of both King and Boulmerka serve as important examples of what 
I mean by suggesting that particular sporting events, and in some cases, certain 
athletes’ careers in general as in the case of Boulmerka, can be read as moral 
narratives.  Moreover, the power of these narratives lies in the fact that they have 
been instrumental in helping to frame important moral issues as well as potentially 
helping to challenge oppressive conceptions about gender and ideology.  I argued that 
sport in general, and these narratives in particular have been effective, in part, 
because of the popularity of sport as a popular cultural form.  By contrast, for 
example, the messages about refinement of moral perceptions that authors like 
Nussbaum and Rorty have advocated for, seem rather limited in their intended 
audience, and as such, appear to be elitist, on the one hand, and moral-agency-
excluding on the other.   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
I have argued that narratives do figure importantly into the moral life of 
people.  Additionally, I have suggested that investigating moral deliberation processes 
of people through the instrument of narrative ethics can indeed yield significantly 
enhanced understanding of human behavior.  Moreover, I have pressed for the 
acceptance and evaluation of sporting narratives-broadly defined-within the domain 
of acceptable moral scholarship. 
A larger aim of this project has been to challenge the theoretical assumptions 
posited by narrative ethicists like Nussbaum, Rorty, and others.  The flaw of these 
authors’ positions, in my view, is that they rely on a narrow, and arguably elitist, 
‘vehicle’ for the enhancement of moral deliberation.  That vehicle, the so called high-
culture literary novel, I have argued, seems to benefit only those exposed to such 
sophisticated literature.  My implicit question, therefore, has been:  Can people who 
neither read, nor have been exposed to such sophisticated literature utilize 
‘alternative’ narratives for moral ends?   
In order to best answer that question, my position has been to expand the 
discourse of narrative ethics, in much the way that Nelson (1997, 2001) suggests by 
allowing for the democratization (and the recognition in the philosophical literature of 
the legitimacy) of the pathways - or moral conduits- that agents utilize in their moral 
deliberations.  I have further argued that these moral conduits need not be predicated 
on sophisticated literature, but rather are often accessed though alternative narrative 
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perspectives.  Due in part to the accessibility of sport experiences, and in part to the 
inclusion of alternative definitions of what constitutes a narrative, as represented in 
sociology and critical sport studies, I suggest that sporting stories as articulated in two 
different forms ought to be included (by moral philosophers and individuals alike) as 
important conduits to moral deliberations.  Building on the increasing turn toward 
narrative in the social sciences and critical sport studies, I have suggested two types 
of sporting narratives that can be read for moral purposes; I have called these 
narratives respectively, sport as autobiography and sport as reflexive narrative.  While 
my suggestion that the purpose of reading narratives with an eye toward moral ends is 
not novel, I have drawn considerably from the discourse of narrative ethics for this 
perspective, still the types of stories (namely sporting narrative) I have suggested 
perhaps blurs the boundaries of a more ridged iteration of that important turn in 
ethical scholarship.  
  I further argue that including sporting narratives, particularly sport as 
autobiography and sport as reflexive narrative into the methods in operation by 
narrative ethicists cannot only better capture the ways that people deliberate over 
moral decisions, but that it insists that those who do in fact refine moral perceptions 
in this way can no longer be excluded as full moral agents. 
 I have also introduced the concepts of the moral conduit, which allows for any 
number of possible pathways to refinement and deliberation of moral questions and 
the idea of moral mobility, which claims that, if one allows for multiple means of 
perception refinement, one has to allow for the inclusion of those who utilize these 
means as full moral agents. 
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 Moreover, I make the stronger claim that sporting narratives, when included 
in the larger context of narratives for moral purposes, can have the additional result of 
democratizing the methods of inclusion that many narratives ethicists have suggested, 
by allowing more moral pathways to be recognized.  Further, I have suggested the 
pluralization of moral frameworks to include those agents who seek moral 
recognition through sports narratives since they must be recognized as capable moral 
agents, even if they do not utilize elitist approaches for moral refinement, for 
example. 
 Lastly, I have argued in favor of recognizing the ability of certain sport 
narratives to be construed as counter narratives which have the desired effect of 
recognizing the moral worth of an agent in two important ways.  First, the sport 
stories that one tells (or reads) can offset oppressive messages bound up in the larger 
meaning-making-cultural stories called master narratives.  The cases of Boulmerka 
and King offer good examples of sport-hued reflexive narratives that can be 
understood to reframe oppressive cultural tales told about strong athletic women in 
the male dominated world of sport.  Second, Armstrong and Tsang’s stories can be 
construed as narrative counterstories that have the desired effect of reframing the 
perspective of the storyteller in important and fundamental ways, thereby reclaiming 
moral agency and, perhaps, allowing one to act in morally estimable ways as a result.  
For Tsang, resisting the oppressive master narrative of the limiting and restrictive 
gender expectations allows her to exercise her agency as a woman (through sport and 
other areas) in a broader and more robust way.  For Armstrong, ironically, his illness 
empowers him in spite of the fact that cancer has undermined the significant cultural 
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privilege of both his sporting accomplishments and his status as a white, heterosexual 
man.  Moreover, for Armstrong, his autobiographical story which traces the 
intersection divergence and reintegration of his sporting and sick bodies, results in the 
dissolution of the selfish and egotistical sporting personality, and emergence of a 
tireless ambassador for the cancer community.  This later outcome of the counterstory 
jibes well with my concept of sport as autobiography and clearly trades on the idea 
that the stories we tell ourselves and others have significant moral bearing on who we 
see ourselves to be and how we are perceived by others.       
 
Future Directions and Practical Projects 
Qualitative research projects 
This project lays the theoretical foundation for continued practical work in 
moral psychology and critical sport studies.  For example, building on the work of 
Fisher and Bredmeier (2000), Hartung (2001) and others, future scholarship might 
include a qualitative study, utilizing ethnographic, in-depth interview methodologies, 
autoethnography, or fictional representations (Sparkes, 2002) that explore the degree 
to which people draw from their sporting experiences when making moral decisions.  
While there has been a considerable amount of work in the sport studies literature that 
looks at issues of identity formation and sport, for example, there is relatively little 
(outside the realm of developmental psychology perhaps) that explores the ways in 
which moral choice and the sporting self are bound together.  I envision a rich 
interdisciplinary project that brings together the perspectives, concepts, theories, and 
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methodologies of the various scholarly areas to better illuminate many of the key 
issues I have raised throughout this dissertation. 
Moreover, drawing from the recent trends in narrative research in sport studies 
and the social sciences in general, and following the work of Sparkes (2002) and 
Denison & Markula (2003), the intersection of sport and the moral world could be 
explored through any number of innovative and revealing new methodologies, 
including, as Bochner & Ellis (1999) provocatively suggest; poetry, short stories, 
memoirs, plays, conversation, dances, novels, and performances as well as more the 
more traditional (yet often contested) forms of qualitative research, including 
autoethnography and ethnographic fiction.  In fact, Tosha Tsang’s autoethnography 
(that I explored in chapter 4) was the result of a call for papers for a special issue of 
the Sociology of Sport Journal 19 which asked contributors to push the boundaries of 
the sociological imagination to tell stories of sport.  Lastly, I envision the new frontier 
of qualitative research that, not only challenges the methodological assumptions of 
the past, but blurs the boundaries of both subject matter and disciplinary orthodoxies 
as well, thereby allowing for a rich and complex understanding of the intersection of 
discourses that help to illuminate the human experience. 
Pedagogical possibilities: Activating sport as autobiography   
As an instructor, I have witnessed the pedagogical possibilities of the sport 
autobiography as a transformative and insightful assignment that helps students to 
define and reflect upon issues of moral significance through the reflective space of 
sport participation.  Following the work of scholars like Liberti (2004), Denison & 
 
19 See the special volume:  Imagining sociological narratives.  Sociology of Sport Journal, 17 (2000).
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Markula (2003), Sparks (2002), and Foley (2002), I would recommend the use of 
personal reflective journals or papers that are geared toward excavating the morally 
relevant content often bound up in one’s sporting experience.  Liberti’s (2004) 
Sociology of Sport writing assignment (narratives of the self), for example, utilized a 
combination critical pedagogy and cultural studies in order to facilitate a more 
reflexive and critical understanding of the meaning and potential reevaluation of 
one’s sport experiences.  This method seems to have the potential to challenge the 
students to reflect upon the impact, both positive and negative, that sport has on their 
understanding of who they are.  In relating the value of the critical autobiography 
assignment for the purpose of examining sociological issues, Liberti (2004) 
concludes:  
[I]t is to our benefit to ask students to engage in critical autobiography in the 
work we do with them.  If we desire to encourage students (and ourselves) to 
think and act more expansively, deeply, and creatively about their (our) own 
movement experiences and those of others, we are served by encouraging 
multiple ways of understanding people’s involvement in sport and physical 
activity.  This should be the goal even if these methods challenge our 
students’ (and our) sensibilities about knowledge and inquiry.  (Liberti 2004, 
p. 205)    
I recommend expanding on a similar assignment, perhaps in a Philosophy of 
Sport class, which seeks, not to illuminate sociological theory, (though an immersion 
into theories that concentrate on issues of power, gender, class, and sexual orientation 
might be of significant value) but rather philosophical and moral ideas.  In this way, 
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students would be empowered to articulate, in their own words, the ways in which 
moral issues and perhaps moral decisions have depended on (in some substantive 
way) the participation, and indeed, the integration of those experiences, whether 
primary or tertiary, into who they see themselves as, and how they choose to make 
particular decisions.  Further, the sport/moral autobiography would certainly offer a 
space to explore the notion of a counterstory in both senses that I have talked about in 
this dissertation.  That is, with the possibility of challenging the ways in which certain 
culturally transmitted stories seem to perpetuate the subjugation of the less 
empowered by those with power.  I argue that, similarly to both Armstrong’s 
autobiography, and to a lesser extent, my own brief story, those who benefit from 
particular privileges in society, may be able to utilize the sport/moral autobiography 
as an introspective and reflexive space to confront and challenge the (often) 
previously unexamined social dominance they profit from.    
It may be obvious, but worth noting nonetheless, that I have not been 
advocating that the sporting experiences that are integrated into one’s complex 
identity are the only experiences that one draws upon when making a moral decision, 
but rather that by focusing (via the critical sport autobiography) attention of that 
integration both students and teachers alike are able to illuminate if and how that 
mechanism operates.  So, in effect, the assignment serves as a practical instantiation 
of a constitutive element of a moral agent’s deliberation process,  a process, I have 
been arguing all along, that while in operation undetected (and often in the 
background), is in operation nonetheless. 
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Sport as reflexive narrative and critical media literacy    
Lastly, another example of a practical application of the ideas I have presented 
in this dissertation have to do with the activation of critical media literacy tools 
(Alvermann & Hagood, 2000; Yasso 2002) for the apprehension of moral themes.  
Borrowing from the disciplinary space of critical media studies, sport studies, and 
critical pedagogy, I suggest the close reading of particular media texts for moral 
content.  This perspective expands on the ideas I sketched out in chapter 6 as it relates 
to “reading” sporting events like the King v. Riggs tennis match or the Black Power 
salute of Carlos & Smith at the 1968 Olympics.  My idea here is to introduce students 
to formal sociological and philosophical theory that will help to frame the images 
they see on the television screen (and in film) in decidedly moral ways.  
Critical media literacy, say Alvermann & Hagood (2000), can do many things 
and has been framed by many academic perspectives, for instance: 
From a cultural studies perspective, critical media literacy is concerned with 
 how society and politics are structured and work to one's advantage or 
 disadvantage and how issues of ideology, bodies, power, and gender produce 
 various cultural artifacts.  From a postmodern perspective, critical media 
 literacy pertains to how individuals take up cultural texts differently, 
 depending on their interests and positioning in various social and historical 
 contexts. Finally, from a feminist pedagogical perspective, critical media 
 literacy focuses on how popular culture texts function to produce certain  
 relations of power and gendered identities that students may learn to use or 
 resist as part of their everyday school experiences.  (p. 195). 
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I have argued that one can interrogate the popular media representations/texts 
of particular sporting events (or perhaps certain sport films) for the larger moral 
themes that are often embedded within them.  Moreover, by encouraging students to 
hone their critical media skills, it is possible, for example, to engage them in a 
philosophical dialogue on a number of moral and ethical issues. 
I teach a freshman seminar, for example, called Moving Pictures:  The 
Critical Examination of Sport and Culture in Popular Film. According to the 
syllabus, the aim of the course is to:  
Critically examine the representation of sport and culture in popular film.  
 Particular attention will be paid to how sport, as a form of popular culture is 
 produced, represented and, ultimately, consumed.  Moreover, the course will 
 examine how dominant ideologies are both perpetuated and resisted in popular 
 sport movies.  A larger aim of the course is to understand (and perhaps 
 resist!), the power of the movies to shape, represent, and reproduce our social 
 reality through the development of media literacy skills.  (Masucci, 2004)  
Moreover, by utilizing the images found in popular culture, it is, perhaps, 
possible to teach sophisticated philosophical ideas in a more accessible manner, thus 
contributing, in an important way, to the possible reflection, redescription, and/or 
reclamation of one’s full moral self.  
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